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Viewpoint: Turkey as a “political” actor in Africa – an assessment of Turkish involvement in Somalia

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The crisis of food security in Somalia in 2011 prompted an increase in Turkish involvement in Eastern African politics. Initially started as a humanitarian response, Ankara’s policy has evolved into a fully fledged Somalia policy with political and social dimensions. This article discusses the role and influence of Turkey in efforts bringing stability to Somalia. It is argued that Turkey’s Somalia policy, as far as it has succeeded in short term, has not only located Turkey as a “political” actor in Africa but also expanded Turkey’s Africa policy into a more complex and multifaceted one. As such, Turkey’s experience in Somalia will have significant implications for its broader African agenda.

Keywords: Turkey; Somalia; foreign policy; aid; civil society; famine

Since Turkey’s “African initiative” saw the emergence of a new focus on the region in 1998, no developments in Africa have attracted Turkey’s attention as much as the 2011 food security crisis in Eastern Africa, especially in Somalia. Broadly speaking, Turkey–Africa relations mark a new era in Turkish foreign policy, characterized by heightened sensitivity about the region shown by the Turkish public, the ruling party, and the opposition, as well as NGOs. In Somalia in particular, Turkey has become deeply involved in political and humanitarian efforts since 2011,¹ such that some Turkish commentators have described Turkey as the “savior” of Somalia.²

On 19 August 2011, shortly after famine was officially declared in parts of southern and central Somalia, then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan led a delegation composed of four ministers, and members of Turkey’s cultural and business elite visit to Mogadishu. Prime Minister Erdoğan also brought his family to highlight the need for greater famine relief and to bring moral support to Somalis. This was the first visit to Mogadishu by a head of state or government from outside Africa in almost 20 years. It marked the start of a sustained increase in Turkish engagement in Somalia. On 25 January 2015, Erdoğan – now as president of Turkey – returned to Mogadishu, for talks with the government and to inaugurate several projects, including a hospital built with Turkish support. Both visits were widely celebrated, and Erdoğan personally appears to be quite popular, especially in Mogadishu, where most of Turkey’s aid projects are concentrated.

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However, Turkey's engagement has not been without its opponents. On 27 July 2013, the Turkish embassy in Mogadishu was attacked, leaving one dead and three wounded in the Turkish security forces.³ Shortly before President Erdoğan's January visit, militants attacked the hotel where the Turkish forward planning team was based.⁴ Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin ("al-Shabaab") claimed responsibility for both attacks.

The Somalis have suffered great political instability and two decades of civil war. Education, health, and other services are weak or absent in much of Somalia. People fleeing the conflict zones take shelter in refugee camps.⁵ About 3.2 million people in Somalia need emergency health services, while 2.8 million people require improved access to water, sanitation, and hygiene.⁶ Following a protracted transitional period (2004–2012), the Somali Federal Government (SFG) is working under a provisional constitution toward elections scheduled for 2016.⁷ Yet, it is unclear if the new political and security mechanisms being developed under the SFG will actually help Somalia to improve its political situation and the lives of its people.

This article intends to shed light on Turkey's involvement in Somalia, as the outside power most recently to seek resolution of the enduring conflict. What are the central motives behind its involvement, and most importantly, can Turkey help to set Somalia on a better path?

Where does Somalia fit within Turkey's Africa policy?

Before any analysis, one must understand Turkey's involvement in Somalia as part of a broader picture.⁸ Since Turkey turned its attention to Africa⁹ in 1998, food insecurity and poverty in Eastern Africa and in Somalia have emerged as its chief interest. Turkish society broadly speaking – including NGOs and even the opposition party, the Republican People's Party (CHP) – has exhibited increased sensitivity to Somalia's persistent problems. This development should be seen as the beginning of a new era in Turkey–Africa relations.

Turkey's active African foreign policy of recent years can be divided into three periods. The first period ran from Turkey's adoption of the Africa Plan in 1998 until the announcement of 2005 as the "Year of Africa." During this time, Turkey spent most of its energy preparing the diplomatic infrastructure for improved Turkey–Africa relations. In the second period, from 2005 to 2011, Turkey redoubled its efforts to deepen relations and opened new embassies in Africa. By these means, Turkey emerged as a strategic partner with the African Union. While trade volume increased between Turkey and African countries,¹⁰ Turkey arranged the Turkey–Africa Summit in 2008, with the goal of deepened institutional relations. In 2011, Turkey's activism in Somalia and its leadership role in publicizing the Somali plight internationally marked the beginning of a third period in Turkish–African relations. In this new era, Ankara's activity will serve as a "litmus test"¹¹ in determining if Turkey will be able to apply its influence to benefit Africa and to help solve its problems.

Between 2002 and 2014, Turkey increased the number of Turkish embassies on the continent from 12 to 39. Turkey's official aid for Africa's regional development surpassed increased from \$3.8 million in 2004 to nearly \$250 million in 2012.¹² The growing presence of Turkish NGOs contributed to these improvements and has paved the way for Turkey's future commitment to the continent. However, some view Turkey as concerned mostly with its own economy and industries, and many associate Turkey with a self-interested approach to trade.¹³ For this reason, many African countries have been suspicious of Ankara's maneuvers over the past decade.¹⁴ However, developments in

recent years have signaled a new phase in the Turkish–African relationship, characterized by enhanced collaboration not only in Africa but also in the global arena.¹⁵ For example, South Africa and Turkey recently developed a relationship of close cooperation and introduced new dialogue mechanisms.¹⁶

The following recent developments further illustrate the depth of Turkish involvement in Africa. Turkey–Africa trade volume increased sixfold, from \$3 billion dollars in 2000 to almost \$23 billion dollars in 2012.¹⁷ The Turkish state organization Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) opened offices in Ethiopia, Sudan, Senegal, Somalia, Kenya, and Tunisia. Turkish Airlines introduced new flights to destinations in Africa, including Accra, Darussalam, Johannesburg, Cape Town, Khartoum, Addis Ababa, Lagos, and Mogadishu. Official Turkish delegations continue to visit Africa, and Turkey has hosted a variety of African delegations. Business unions have visited African countries and established new trade links. The Directorate for Religious Affairs (*Diyanet*) invites Muslim religious leaders from Africa to Istanbul for consultation every four years, and recently many Turkish universities have launched African research departments. It seems likely that Turkey’s involvement in Somalia will bolster its cooperation with other African countries and institutions.

Turkey’s involvement in Somalia

As relations with Africa continue to develop rapidly, Turkey’s first major test in Africa will probably be in Somalia. Erdoğan has placed special emphasis on Somalia’s instability and hunger problem, making special reference to the crisis in an address to the UN General Assembly meeting in September 2011. On 31 October 2011, Turkey became the first non-African country to appoint a new ambassador to the country in more than two decades, based at an embassy in Mogadishu rather than working from a neighboring capital (e.g. Nairobi). Erdoğan has made promises to support for Somalia and demanded reform of the UN which he accused of serving the interest of only certain countries.¹⁸

Prefamine engagement

Turkey’s engagement in Somalia significantly predates the 2011 famine crisis. Turkish–Somali relations officially began with the opening of the Somali Embassy in Ankara in 1979. However, Turkey’s most significant prior engagement took place in collaboration with international undertakings. A joint military force from the USA and the UN, the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) – including Turkish troops – was deployed to Mogadishu in 1991, to monitor a ceasefire and deliver food and supplies. In May 1993, Çevik Bir, then a Turkish lieutenant general, was appointed as the force commander of the second UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II).¹⁹ This mission not only failed but also harbored in the Somalis great aversion toward Bir and the Turks.²⁰ This negative legacy emphasizes the significance of the perceived turnaround in sentiment following Erdoğan’s 2011 visit. To understand this, it is necessary to go back a few years earlier, to the last stages of Somalia’s (largely dysfunctional) Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

In 2009, the TFG officially asked Turkey to facilitate its efforts for peace.²¹ Turkey neither took action immediately nor neglected the request. Aware of the limitations of its power and influence, Ankara decided not to approach the task alone. The Turkish government brought forward the issue to the UN and consulted with the African Union.

As part of these proceedings, the UN oversaw the First Somalia Conference in Istanbul on 21–23 May 2010. This conference did not yield concrete results, but it did help Somalia in several ways. After several years in which international attention to Somalia had been dominated by the problem of piracy off the Somali coast, the conference highlighted the significance of political processes in restoring stability. In addition, the conference allowed Turkey to gauge the opinions of other countries and international organizations and to consider possible and appropriate courses of action in Somalia. This conference and a subsequent conference, organized by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in 2011, were mostly brainstorming sessions that allowed the exchange of ideas and perceptions. However, they produced several tangible results. One consequence of the OIC conference was the establishment of an observatory group on Somalia, under Turkey's guidance and working closely with the Islamic Development Bank.²²

Policy focal points

Ankara's involvement in Somalia can be explained with a special focus on three approaches. Humanitarianism has been the main theme and since the beginning this has been one of the most pronounced official discourses on Somalia. Humanitarianism does not only have the components of emergency aid but also included development aid aspect. With a mixture of both aid policies, Turkey has become a leading visible figure in Somalia.

The second aspect of Turkey's Somalia policy is related to implementation of its development policies. There has been a convergence of state apparatus and civil society organizations on the ground. This unofficial coalition – most of the time it has lacked perfect coordination – has boosted Turkey's overall visibility in Somalia. Most importantly, whatever has been done in Somalia, irrespective of whether it has been done by state institutions or civil society, all credit went to Turkey, making it appear as if Ankara is the initiator of everything.

The third aspect of Ankara's involvement is its regional approach. Turkey has realized that that "Somalia issue" goes beyond the nation state and includes regional and global dimensions. This policy has mostly stemmed from a geopolitical understanding that without solving the regional balance, any peace in Somalia is likely to be temporary. In the Fifth Annual Meeting of Ambassadors in Ankara, on 2 January 2013, then-Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu demonstrated Turkey's recognition of the issue at hand, when he announced Turkey's integrated strategy addressing the issues in Eastern Africa as a whole. Davutoğlu discussed Ankara's diplomatic commitment to ease tensions between Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan, and Somalia.²³ When it opened an embassy in Eritrea in 2013, Turkey became the only country to have embassies in all countries in the region.

Humanitarian and developmental engagement

In mid-2011, Turkey launched its campaign for significant humanitarian aid and economic development in Somalia. After the famine was declared in central and southern Somalia, Turkish NGOs coordinated with other international NGOs and initiated humanitarian activities to save Somali lives. The humanitarian response to the Somalia famine indicates not only Turkey's international significance, but also the growing influence of the general Islamic world.²⁴ Upon the UN's urgent plea for aid, the OIC,

individual Islamic countries including Turkey and Qatar, and various NGOs from across the Islamic world poured into Somalia to provide relief.

Turkish involvement in Somalia has been visible in a variety of areas. In the political sphere, Turkey has led relief efforts from the international community. For example, Turkey called an emergency meeting on 17 August 2011 with the OIC executive committee at the ministerial level in Istanbul. At this meeting, 40 member countries gathered and committed \$350 million for famine relief in Somalia.²⁵ This Turkey-initiated endeavor was the first significant response by the Islamic world to Somalia's food crisis. Erdoğan's visit to Mogadishu during Ramadan was a milestone for Turkish activism in Somalia.²⁶ This visit brought attention to the ongoing crisis in two ways. First, the visit's timing, during the holy month when Muslims fast during the day, allowed people to better appreciate the plight of the Somalis. Second, dramatic images of malnourished children on TV and newspaper front pages made an impression on Turkey. The media was instrumental in drawing attention to Somali crisis, and it familiarized the Turkish people with Somalia's humanitarian, political, and economic problems. As a result of this publicity, NGO and government fund-raising campaigns soon raised about \$300 million for the Somali relief effort.²⁷

In September 2011, Erdoğan addressed the UN General Assembly about Somalia's famine. In his speech, he called upon member countries to provide support and to help defeat the famine. One month later, he published an article titled "The Tears of Somalia" in *Foreign Policy* magazine, which argued for the world's moral obligation to intervene, and called once again for urgent action in Somalia.²⁸

Political engagement

After the London Somalia Conference in February 2012, Turkey hosted the Second Istanbul Conference on Somalia at the end of May to continue the discussion of Somalia's future with a variety of important international actors. The conference bore the title "Preparing Somalia's Future: Goals for 2015." Partnership forums were held to discuss Somalia's water, energy, roads, and other issues. The conference developed a pathway to Somalia's rehabilitation in a comprehensive, five-point plan to rebuild the failed state. Those five points were the construction of national unity, the establishment of a new political system, the comprehensive economic reconstruction, the rebuilding of a Somali national military, and an end to the Somalia's regional isolation.²⁹

In the interest of peace and stability in Somalia, the Turkish government has employed a plan with five objectives: to provide emergency aid (particularly during 2011 and 2012), long-term developmental assistance, technical and personnel capacity building, scholarships for Somali students, and an improved Somali-Turkish trade relationship. Apart from these objectives, Turkey has continued to promote Somalia's unity. It backed the establishment of the SFG in 2012. Turkey's activity in Somalia has also indirectly influenced the UN and others to shift from a tendency to operate remotely from headquarters outside Somalia, usually in Nairobi, and move inside Somalia. In addition, Turkey has shown willingness to facilitate a dialogue between fighting groups in Somalia, although it has not yet taken action.³⁰

Economic and soft power engagement

The initial impetus for Turkey's involvement in Somalia was a humanitarian consideration, but Turkey has since explored other dimensions of the relationship such as new

markets and political prestige in the global arena. With these interests in mind, since the Second Istanbul Conference on Somalia in 2012, Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ and Davutoğlu (as foreign minister) have each visited Mogadishu, followed by President Erdoğan's return visit in 2015. In the same period, Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud paid several visits to Turkey, emphasizing the budding partnership between Turkey and Somalia.³¹ Turkey is also becoming involved with Somalia militarily, as recent agreements have authorized Turkey to train the Somalia's police and military forces.³² In 2012, Turkish Economy Minister Zafer Çağlayan coordinated a Turkish–Somali trade and investment forum, which reported optimism for Somalia's economic opportunities in the private sector, if provided with international support and political stability.³³ There was particular optimism about Somalia's potential development of oil and natural gas reserves.³⁴

While its economic relations with Somalia grow, Turkey continues to pursue its initial goal of humanitarian improvements. This was even visible in the appointment of its first ambassador to Somalia: Kani Torun, the former chairman of the UK branch of Doctors Worldwide, an NGO. Instead of appointing a diplomat from the Foreign Affairs, Turkey selected a humanitarian worker with a sensitivity to Islam.

Turkey has delivered around \$500 million in aid to Somalia through its developmental and humanitarian projects.³⁵ About 500 Turks are estimated to be based in Somalia. Turkey has reconstructed the Mogadishu airport, built schools, and constructed a 200-bed hospital in the capital. The Turkish General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSI) has been digging wells, while TIKA renovated the old parliament building and constructed a road between the Mogadishu Airport and the city center. Turkey has also donated garbage trucks for Somalia's waste management project. The Turkish Red Crescent (KIZILAY) has been supporting a refugee camp for 15,000 people. Some 1600 Somali students of different ages have received scholarships to attend Turkish schools.³⁶ *Diyanet* is distributing copies of the Quran, sending local Imams to Turkey for training, and repairing ruined Somali mosques. In the capital, the Turkish Ministry of Health in cooperation with TIKA now runs the biggest hospital complex of Somalia, and Turkish health professionals and surgeons visit Mogadishu on rotation to train the Somalis in medical practice. Turkish Airlines (THY) has introduced direct flights from Istanbul to Mogadishu, in an effort to connect Somalia more closely with Turkey and the rest of the world. The Prime Ministry Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) coordinates transportation of construction and humanitarian materials between Istanbul and Mogadishu.

Many Turkish NGOs have been active in the country, especially in central and southern Somalia. Turkish NGOs have circumvented restrictions on foreign organizations by working with local Somalia NGOs to deliver aid and implement their projects in distressed areas, or in some cases coordinated their projects from their headquarters in Turkey. Doctors Worldwide took over operations at a new, advanced hospital in Mogadishu.³⁷ The IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation is in the process of building the biggest orphanage complex on the Horn of Africa. The IHH has taken up the cause of Somali agriculture, and it has built wells and constructed irrigation channels to provide clean drinking water and increase agricultural capacity.³⁸ *Yardım Eli* is building a 100-bed children's hospital³⁹ in Mogadishu, while *Deniz Feneri* runs another 10-bed hospital⁴⁰ in the capital and is constructing an education center for women. *Cansuyu* offers projects for orphaned Somalis and is constructing a school.⁴¹

The Islamic identity of Turkish NGOs was essential to their ability to deliver humanitarian aid in 2011. On several occasions, Imams affiliated with al-Shabaab have

criticized Turks as Western invaders in disguise, and the group has attacked Turkish interests multiple times since 2011.⁴² However, Turks have only rarely been targeted in violence by other Somali groups.⁴³ Moreover, while al-Shabaab forbids foreign groups entry into its domains under militia control, it did permit Turkish NGOs to provide humanitarian relief through their local Somali partners. This privilege enhanced the status of Turkish NGOs in Somalia and may have indicated improvement in al-Shabaab's attitude toward Turkey.⁴⁴ As a result, Turkey was able to coordinate humanitarian projects with greater success than other countries.

Conclusion

Turkey won the appreciation and trust of Somalis across the country with its foreign aid campaign since 2011. Turkey's efforts are viewed by at least some in Somalia as a humanitarian gesture and an honest initiative, rather than a politically motivated show.⁴⁵ Former Prime Minister of Somalia Abdiweli Mohamed Ali has described Turkey as the "Holy Grail" for Somalia in the Second Istanbul Conference on Somalia.⁴⁶ Although the Somali people are eager to be rid of civil war, some are wary of West and the UN political agenda. Some believe Western countries have secret agendas to capture Somalia's natural sources and fear UN backing of such Western plans. Somalis have contrasted this with Turkey's engagement, in view of its Islamic identity and its "honest" relief effort.⁴⁷

On the other hand, there has also been some criticism of Turkey's efforts in Somalia. Turkish aid organized by state institutions has been concentrated in Mogadishu, Somaliland, and Puntland, and other regions in Somalia have received little support.⁴⁸ The underserved populations espouse relatively negative sentiments toward Turkey, and the imbalance of aid thus reduces Turkey's influence in the national political process.⁴⁹ Turkey's scholarship program initially has also had negative effects on the Somali perception of Turkey, in its relocation of many Somali students to Turkey, which was understood as damaging, not improving, the Somali education system. However, it should be taken into consideration that Turkey is giving scholarships to a sizeable number of students since 2011, and rather than damaging it is actually contributing to education system by training future academics. It is more a future investment into Somali education.

Turkey has taken action to work beyond these criticisms. The Turkish systems of education and health continue to sponsor scholarship programs for Somali students and voluntary doctor's clinics. In addition to providing aid to Somalia, Turkey's efforts at the same time provide good publicity for its medical practices, education system, and NGOs. Exposure to these institutions provides a model for the new generation of Somalis. Insofar as it is perceived to be successful, Turkey's activity in Somalia is likely to earn it trust and respect from Somalia and other African countries. Turkey's experience in Somalia will be valuable in addressing the continent's other problems, and African leaders may count on Turkey as an important ally. However, failure in Somalia by Turkey will increase African contempt and distrust toward Turkey and its institutions. Whether success, failure, or something in between, Turkey's performance in Somalia will shape the future of Turkish–African relations.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. For Turkish involvement in Somalia, see Akpınar, "Turkey's Peacebuilding in Somalia"; Tank, *Turkey's New Humanitarian Approach in Somalia*; and Ozkan, *Turkey's Involvement in Somalia*.
2. For example, see "Somali Ambassador Nur Sheikh Hamud Mursal: We regret discovering Turkey very late", *Today's Zaman*, 16 April 2012 http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?sessionId=B854569300A001B106738DF9A56D096D?newsId=277676 (accessed 10 October 2012).
3. "Al-Shabaab claim attack on Turkish mission in Somalia, three dead", Reuters, 27 July 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/28/us-somalia-conflict-idUSBRE96Q0A420130728> (accessed 20 August 2013).
4. See "SOMALIA: President of Somalia's Statement on the Terrorist Attack on the SYL Hotel in Mogadishu: 'al-Shabaab Seek To Thrive On Headlines: Tomorrow We Will Give You Better Headlines'", RBC Radio, <http://www.raxanreeb.com/2015/01/somalia-president-of-somalias-statement-on-the-terrorist-attack-on-the-syl-hotel-in-mogadishu-al-shabaab-seek-to-thrive-on-headlines-tomorrow-we-will-give-you-better-headlines/> (accessed 18 March 2015).
5. See Lindley, "Displacement in contested places".
6. See OCHA, "Somalia: 2015 Humanitarian Needs Overview".
7. See Hammond, "Somalia rising".
8. This section draws largely on Ozkan, "Turkey's Religious and Socio-Political Depth in Africa". See also Ozkan, *Turkey's Involvement in Somalia*.
9. For earlier involvement that led to this process, see Ozkan and Akgun, "Turkey's Opening to Africa".
10. For economic dimension of the relations, see Ozkan, "A New Actor or Passer-by?"
11. Indeed, Erdogan argued that the case of Somalia is a "litmus test" for the international community. See, "BM'ye Somali albümü", *Sabah*, 23 August 2011.
12. See Hasimi, "Turkey's Humanitarian Diplomacy and Development Cooperation".
13. See Farrell, "Understanding Turkish involvement in Somalia".
14. See Ozkan, "A Post-2014 Vision for Turkey-Africa Relations".
15. Especially development of relations between Turkey and South Africa can be considered as this sort since 2010.
16. "Güney Afrika vizesi kalkıyor", *Al-Jazeera Turk*, 20 September 2011.
17. See the Turkish Ministry of Economy website for trade figures: http://www.economy.gov.tr/portal/faces/home/disiliskiler/ulkeler/africa?_afzLoop=399765660791261&_afzWindowMode=0&_afzWindowId=uxy397c0r_70#!%40%40%3F_afzWindowId%3Duxy397c0r_70%26_afzLoop%3D399765660791261%26_afzWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3Duxy397c0r_90 (accessed 9 April 2015).
18. Address by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to the general debate of the 66th session of the UN General Assembly http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/66/TR_en.pdf (accessed 6 April 2015).
19. For details see "UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA II: MISSION BACK-GROUNDER", <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosom2b.htm> (accessed 12 August 2012); also, see International Crisis Group, *Assessing Turkey's Role in Somalia*.
20. For example, see "Hate for Bir, love for Erdoğan", *Today's Zaman*, 17 April 2012 http://www.todayszaman.com/turkish-press-review_hate-for-bir-love-for-erdogan_277754.html (accessed 6 April 2015).
21. See "Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy", Address by H.E. Foreign Minister of Republic of Turkey Davutoğlu, 8 December 2009, Washington, DC <http://arsiv.setav.org/ups/dosya/14808.pdf> (accessed 10 May 2010).
22. See "Davutoğlu: 'Somali Görev Gücü' oluşturuldu", 17 August 2011, *Zaman*, http://www.zaman.com.tr/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?haberno=1170269 (accessed 10 September 2012).
23. See Davutoğlu, Address to 5th Annual Meeting of Ambassadors, Ankara, 2 January 2013, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-ahmet-davutoglu_nun-v_-buyukelciler-konferansinda-yaptigi-konusma_-2-ocak-2013_-ankara.tr.mfa (accessed 15 January 2013).
24. See Islamic leaders respond to Turkish plea for Somalia famine aid, *Deutsche Welle*, 17 August 2011 <http://www.dw.de/islamic-leaders-respond-to-turkish-plea-for-somalia-famine-aid/a-15324271-1> (accessed 7 April 2015).

25. See "OIC members vow to donate \$350 million to Somalia", 18 August 2011, Middle East Online, <http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=47685> (accessed 6 April 2015).
26. See Aynte, "Turkey's Increasing Role in Somalia".
27. See Heaton, "Saving Somalia".
28. See Erdogan, "Tears of Somalia".
29. See "The Second Istanbul Conference on Somalia, Final Declaration", 1 June 2012, İstanbul, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-second-istanbul-conference-on-somalia-final-declaration_-1-june-2012_istanbul.en.mfa (accessed 20 March 2015); See also, "United Somalia a Must: Davutoğlu", Al Shahid, <http://english.alshahid.net/archives/29081> (accessed 7 April 2015).
30. See Erdogan, "Tears of Somalia".
31. See "Somali president pays visit to Turkish parliament head", 5 December 2012, Anadolu Agency, <http://www.aa.com.tr/en/tag/108299-somali-president-pays-visit-to-turkish-parliament-head> (accessed 6 April 2015).
32. See "Somali'nin askerini Türkiye yetiştirecek", 7 December 2012, Yeni Şafak, <http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/gundem-haber/somalinin-askerini-turkiye-yetistirecek-07.12.2012-433154> (accessed 6 April 2015).
33. See "Türkiye-Somali Ticaret ve Yatırım Forumu", 6 December 2012, <http://www.tuskon.org/?p=content&gl=faaliyetler&cl=faaliyet&i=419> (accessed 6 April 2015).
34. See Farrell, "Understanding Turkish Involvement in Somalia".
35. See Abukar Arman, "Erdogan: The Hero of Somalia", 21 January 2015, Al-Jazeera, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/01/visit-erdogan-somalia-2015121124331818818.html> (accessed 6 April 2015).
36. See Aynte, "Turkey's Increasing Role in Somalia".
37. See Richard Lough, "Turkey tries out soft power in Somalia", Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/03/somalia-turkey-idUSL5E8GP2LP20120603> (accessed 15 December 2012).
38. See "Somali halkına nitelikli tarım öğretiliyor", İHH website, 6 June 2014, <http://www.ihh.org.tr/tr/main/news/0/somali-halkina-nitelikli-tarim-ogretiliyor/2362> (accessed 6 April 2015).
39. See "Somali hastanemizin kolonları bağlandı", 26 February 2013, Yardımcı Derneği, <http://www.yardimeli.org.tr/h=18601?somali-hastanemizin-kolonlari-baglandi#.VSOhdNysXQQ> (accessed 6 April 2015).
40. See "Deniz Feneri Somali'de kalıcı işler yapıyor", Deniz Feneri Derneği, http://www.denizfeneri.org.tr/bagisci/afrika_137/somali_58/ (accessed 6 April 2015).
41. See "Cansuyu Derneği Somali'ye okul yaptıracak", 30 July 2012, Haberler.com, <http://www.haberler.com/cansuyu-dernegi-somali-ye-okul-yaptiracak-3824336-haberi/> (accessed 6 April 2015).
42. See Farrell, "Understanding Turkish Involvement in Somalia".
43. See "Somali'de bir Türk yaralandı", Sabah, <http://www.sabah.com.tr/Dunya/2012/10/03/somalide-bir-turk-yaralandi> (accessed 09 April 2015).
44. See Orakçı, "Somali'nin geleceği ve 2015 hedefleri".
45. See Aynte, "Turkey's Increasing Role in Somalia".
46. See Uluso, "Message from Istanbul II Conference".
47. Anti-Western and anti-UN rethorics are often used by radical groups for many years to attract youth for their armed groups. The authors of this article also heard such beliefs expressed informally many times by people from different age groups and social backgrounds. On the other hand, many expressed informally warm feelings toward Turkey and appreciation of its Islamic face.
48. See "Somalia: Puntland and Galmudug say Turkey Conference is politically motivated", AllAfrica.com, 27 May 2012 <http://allafrica.com/stories/201205280352.html> (accessed 30 November 2012).
49. See Yusuf Dirir Ali, "Somalia: Turkey is dead wrong", Somaliland Press, 2 June 2012, <http://www.somalilandpress.com/somalia-turkey-is-dead-wrong/> (accessed 10 December 2012).

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