

REGIONAL SECURITY AND GLOBAL WORLD ORDER: THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA IN AFRICA¹

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INTRODUCTION

When the Cold War ended, starting with ‘the end of history’ and ‘the clash of civilizations’ theories, many discussions took place within academic and political circles about the prediction on how the future world order would look like. Although the global world order is something that everybody understands and uses in a different context, after 9/11 presumably there is a consensus about how to reach global world order: to make the world secure. Historically, societies experienced a global world order after each war, such as World War I and II. In a similar vain, in the past sometimes waging a war was regarded as the way to create a new order, after all the options resorted. However, after the 9/11 reaching a world order through war became less supported if at all. This could be seen as an ideological change, and one can attribute such a change to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, huge human disastrously results of any kind of war whether it is big in scale or small, and increasing terrorism that has been more visible in a global form after 9/11.

Bearing all in mind, this paper does not intend to analyse the current world structure, however it aims to investigate the connections between regional security and global world order by emphasising on the role of pivotal middle powers. It is important to note that any global order or disorder primarily affects the regions; nevertheless regional conflicts do not necessary have an impact as strong as the global ones. In the beginning a new definition of power category in global politics, pivotal middle power, was followed by the section that deals with the role of South Africa in peacemaking and peacekeeping in Africa. Bringing South Africa to the spotlight, this paper will conclude with some comments on how such middle power can play key role in making a new world order, if only they could act together.

REGIONS, PIVOTAL MIDDLE POWERS AND GLOBAL POLITICS

It is generally recognized that global peace had been maintained during the Cold War by the strategic balance between the two superpowers. However, after the

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collapse of the Soviet Union, this benign equilibrium in the global system has lost its significance. The global influence of regional organizations such as OAU, OSCE, OIC etc., had been limited during the Cold War period mainly due to systemic reasons that gave the primary role to NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact). The security functions carried out especially by regional organizations have had only minor significance at the global level.³ Only one aspect of the security functions of regional organizations could be viewed as globally relevant, which was the priority given to the organizations' peacekeeping efforts over those of the United Nations. In the event of disturbance of the peace in the regions, the relevant organization's peacekeeping mechanisms were utilized first, and only if ineffective, is the United Nations resorted to for assistance. Almost all conflicts during this period proliferated with the encouragement and contribution of either the United States or the Soviet Union, making each conflict the proxy of confrontation of the two superpowers in a third venue. Accordingly, the superpowers seldom promoted a role for regional organizations or power in conflict resolution in which they played a key role. Consequently, regional organizations and regional power either played only a marginal role or acted as an *agent* of the superpowers. In both cases, the role of regional organizations and powers were *passive* and *dependent* rather *active* and *independent*.

With the end of the Cold War, however, international relations is no longer based on the polarizing confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union. This new environment gave regional organizations and regional powers an opportunity to play a leading role in conflict resolution either independently or in cooperation with the UN. They are no longer regarded as *passive* and *dependent* participant of international relations, but have had a chance to shape and influence the global politics on their behalf.

In the post-Cold War environment there has been a vivid revivalism in the third world in general and in the regions particularly through the powerful states in the area. Resistance to being part of a US-led global order, or indeed any order, where the institutions are dominated by strong states and fear being left out, having no place in the negotiation table, have all served to both to promote the forces of rationalisation and also the demand that they be taken seriously. A common fear among the developing countries since the end of the Cold War is that the UN and other international institutions have been hijacked or bypassed by the powerful western states.⁴ This fear was widely expressed during the 2003

³ Werner J. Feld, "Regional Organizations and the Global System", in Werner J. Feld and Gavin Boyd (eds), *Comparative Regional Systems, West and East Europe, North America, the Middle East, and Developing Countries*, New York: Pergamon Press, 1980, p.491.

⁴ Mats Berdal, *Wither UN Peacekeeping?*, Adelphi Paper no 281, London: International Institute for Security Studies, 1993.p.74.

Gulf War by many countries, WTO negotiations, and in the debates on the reform of UN Security Council. Today's global institutional structure is far from representing global realities and power balance. Such a belief has led the countries in the periphery to focus on regional initiatives and might provide incentives to collaboration.⁵

After the brutal attack of 9/11 to the US in 2001, the directions of global politics have changed substantially. It did not only show the West's evident inability to develop a new approach to international relations after the Cold War, but also announced the end of *the period of interim agreements, or truce* after the Cold War as we have seen in Bosnia, Iraq until the 2003 war and many other conflicts.⁶ Between the collapse of Soviet Union and 9/11 attacks, one witnessed a period where there were little or no lasting solutions proposed to global or local problems. Instead, they were left frozen. During the truce period, each state built its own backyard to be strong player in the next round. Germany did so by deepening the European Union integration, mainly through unifying the currency, *euro*, against American *dollar*; France by consolidating its power as Europe's only nuclear state and not allowing any other state to reach such level; Britain by balancing its diplomatic strength between the US and the EU, being a key player at both sides; Russia by revising its relations with the former Soviet areas; China by developing itself economically as fast as possible⁷; and finally Africa by adapting its institutions such as the African Union to post-Cold War environment and primarily dealing with its own problems rather than seeking help from outside. Form this point of view; this period could be regarded as an interim period, though extremely important, prior to the global powers start to build a new global world order, conducive to their self interests.

So far, mainly because of the each country's built-up process and their intention to freeze conflicts rather than find a lasting solution, the talk of the new world order evaporated as Cold War-type conflicts dragged alongside the now familiar 'new wars', which the big powers do not interfere in if the conflict is not central to their strategic and political policy. Moreover, the UN as an institution primarily responsible for global peace and other global institutions have failed to match expectations and adjust to the new and unfamiliar challenges of global and regional conflicts.

The failure of institutions and their being hijacked by the west as mentioned above, have created a lack of trust to such institutions. Coupled with the problem of representation of different cultural and religious groups, most of the

⁵ Louise Fawcett, "*The Evolving Architecture of Regionalization*", in M. Pugh and W. Pal Singh Sidhu (eds), *The United Nations & Regional Security, Europe and Beyond*, London: Lynne Rienner, 2003, p.18.

⁶ Terms are taken from Ahmet Davutoglu, Kuresel Bunalim (The Global Chaos), Istanbul: Kure Yayinlari, 2002.

⁷ Ibid, p.20.

societies have felt alienated the current global order. While China has the third biggest economy, India is one of the fastest developing economies in the world, however, both do not have representation in the global economic body G-8, which excludes almost one-third of the global population from the system. Similarly, no Muslim country has representation in the UN Security Council, the main body for global decision-making, and the G-8. If taken together the exclusion of the Islamic world, in India and China form the G-8, one can say that only one-third of the global population is being represented in the global political institutions although they make decisions on behalf of others, usually at the others' expense without any consultation.⁸

Before further analysis, for the purpose of this study, a description of Pivotal Middle Power (PMP) is needed because of a new kind of power category that will be used in relations to regions and their power centre. In general, references to international regions are common in everyday language of politics. Such references identify geographic cluster of states and represent sub-systems of the international system. While some regional references paradigm-founder and have objective definition with coherence in its definition such as 'East Europe' or 'North Africa', some represent a subjective-descriptive definition depending on from where one looks at, such as the 'Middle East'.⁹ Generally speaking, every region has its own 'superpower' that is by far politically influential over others. For the purpose of this study, the regional 'superpower' will be defined as a 'pivotal middle power'. In definition, pivotal middle power is more than merely a combination of some theories, such as 'Pivotal state'¹⁰ and 'middle power'.¹¹ This new definition does not only represent merely a power that influential in its own region, but also implies a state that could play critical role in international politics where the issues are beyond the region. It is also to be noted that such states are not *agents* of global superpowers in their respective regions. Their interest might couple with that of superpower/s from time to time, but it does not mean, at least theoretically, that they tend to be *agents*. By contrast, when the superpowers need these pivotal middle powers more than

⁸ These themes are discussed in details convincingly in Ahmet Davutoglu, *Civilizational Transformation and the Muslim World*, Kuala Lumpur: Mahir Publications, 1994; Richard Falk, "False Universalism and the Geopolitics of Exclusion: the Case of Islam", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 18, No 1, 1997, pp.7-23.

⁹ Ahmet Davutoglu, *Stratejik Derinlik, Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu (Strategic Depth, Turkey's International Position)*, Istanbul: Kure Yayınları, 2001, p.129.

¹⁰ For more information see Robert Chase, Emily Hill and Paul Kennedy, "Pivotal States and US Strategy", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 75, no.1, January-February 1996; and their edited book *The Pivotal States, A New Framework for US Policy in the Developing World*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999.

¹¹ See Andrew F. Cooper & Higgott, Richard A. and Nossal, Richard K., *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993; and Andrew F. Cooper (ed), *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers After the Cold War*, London: Macmillan, 1997.

normal times, they could deny the cooperation and act independently. This behaviour might change from time to time and also from issue to issue depending on the responses of domestic contingencies. If regional concerns are so strong and against the interventions of superpowers, such states could undermine the plan of the superpower.

The pivotal middle power concept might even be seen as an elaborated version of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) developed by Buzan and Wæver.¹² Their central argument is that 'since most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters: security complexes.'¹³ Security complexes, they argue, 'are regions as seen through the lens of security'.¹⁴ Their underlying argument for focusing on region is that the RSCT, by applying to international system, 'offers a vision for emerging world order'.¹⁵ They also convincingly assert that 'the regional level will always be operative and sometimes dominant'.¹⁶ The regional level may or may not dominate, but it will always be in play in some significant sense and therefore cannot be dropped out of the analysis.

Buzan and Wæver are also of the opinion that the conditions of the post-Cold War world will enhance the salience of the regional level for security.¹⁷ While this argument is the basis of the pivotal middle power concept, it fills the gap that Buzan and Wæver do not touch in real and practical sense. Whereas the security complexes is very analytical, and certainly true in understanding today's global politics, how such security complexes can contribute to global order in practical terms are not explained.

Pivotal middle power approach is of the similar opinion with the RSCT in analysing regions and global politics in broader perspective. For them, the theories are generated in global level and the regions fitted into them, creating a top-down approach in most of the time. As once Waltz¹⁸ aptly said, since Thucydides, the traditional focus of international politics has been on the great powers. This has meant that the role of middle-sized states has either been ignored or downplayed. Aware of such a approach, Buzan and Wæver emphasise that RSCT is a bottom-up approach in attempting to capture the particularities of regions and then assemble the global picture from these

¹² Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers, The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

¹³ *Ibid*, p.4.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, p.43-44.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, p.40.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, p.52.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, p.52.

¹⁸ Waltz, Kenneth, *Theory of International Politics*, New York: Random House, 1979, p.72.

components.¹⁹ In that sense, PMP and RSCT are the same on the basis that they are not top-down approaches. PMP argues that if the PMPs came together from different regions and, furthermore, were able to act together, one would see the increasing influence of regions and their 'superpowers', the PMPs, in global politics. This process can even be called as the glocalisation of globalisation in international relations.

In post-Cold War environment, pivotal middle powers increasingly have been playing critical roles in their regional security as well as global security through their contribution to peacekeeping and peacemaking process. While they are influential in their regions, their contributions are limited on the global scale. Since the 9/11, pivotal middle powers must be expected to play more influential roles globally once they have chance to do so.

REGIONAL SECURITY: THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA IN AFRICA

South Africa after the end of apartheid in 1994 emerged as a key country in African affairs. From the political to the economic fore, without South Africa's involvement none of the policy toward Africa has been discussed in western and eastern circles alike. It has been the same case for ending Africa's wars and bringing peace to the war-torn continent. Although South Africa's peace initiative in securing Africa started as early as 1994 when after immediate transformation of the country from apartheid to democracy, for the purpose of this paper, only its some of the latest peace initiatives will be discussed. In this regard, Pretoria's involvement in the Ivory Coast and Burundian peace process will be analysed.

South Africa's Involvement in Ivory Coast Peace Process

South Africa's intervention in the Ivorian conflict at the request of the African Union started after the January 2003 peace accord, mediated by France, collapsed in November 2004. For more than two years, the Ivory Coast has effectively been split into two, with rebels controlling the Muslim north and the government controlling the south. A mutiny by disgruntled members of the Ivorian army on September 19, 2002 sparked a wider conflict over long-standing grievances claimed by northern Muslims that government discriminated against them.

Before the election could take place, the Ivory Coast experienced its first military coup. On December 25, 1999, General Guei ousted Bedie, the president of Ivory Coast, who was forced to flee to France. Following the bloodless takeover, Guei formed a new government and promised to hold open

¹⁹Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, *Regions and Powers, The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.85.

elections in late 2000. Tensions increased when the general's handpicked Supreme Court disqualified all of the candidates from the two major parties by establishing the criteria that requested all candidates must have two Ivorian parents and never held a nationality of another country. This barred Alassane Ouattara and his Rally of Republicans party, or Rassemblement des Republicaines (RDR), from running after the courts declared that his mother was from Burkina Faso. The RDR called for a boycott, setting the stage for low election turnout in a race between Guei and Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) candidate Laurent Gbagbo. When early polling results showed Gbagbo in the lead, Guei stopped the process, claimed polling fraud, disbanded the election commission, and declared himself the winner. Within hours Gbagbo supporters took to the streets of Abidjan, the main city of the Ivory Coast. A bloody fight followed as crowds attacked the guards protecting the presidential palace. Many gendarmes and soldiers joined the fight against the junta government, forcing Guei to flee. Gbagbo, who was thought to have been the real winner of the election, was declared President. Having been excluded from the election, Ouattara's supporters, the RDR, took the streets calling for new elections. More violence erupted as forces loyal to the new government joined the FPI youth to attack RDR demonstrators. After hundreds were killed in a few days, RDR Leader Alassane Ouattara called for peace and recognized the Gbagbo presidency.²⁰

On 7 January 2001, another coup attempt shattered the temporary calm. However in March of 2001, Ouattara and Gbagbo met for the first time following the violence between their supporters and agreed to work together towards reconciliation. Local municipal elections later that month were conducted without violence and with the full participation of all political parties. The RDR, who had boycotted the presidential and legislative elections, won the majority of the local seats, followed by the Democratic Party of Cote d'Ivoire (PDCI), which was the party of former President Bedie, and the FPI. The situation in the country calmed down. As a sign of this, some economic aid from the European Union began to re-emerge by the summer of 2001, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) re-engaged the government. All over the officers involved in the incident were acquitted. In August 2002, President Gbagbo formed a de facto government of national unity that included the RDR party.

Ivory Coast slid into civil war after a failed September 2002 attempt to oust President Gbagbo, with insurgents taking control of the north and government forces controlling the rich south, which is the world's largest cocoa exporter. This literally resulted in the division of the country into two.²¹ Amid this

²⁰ www.globalsecurity.org, 8 September 2005.

²¹ Thabo Mbeki, "*Claiming the 21st Century*", ANC Today, Vol 5, No 35, 2-8 September 2005, p.2. www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2005/at35.htm accessed 6 September 2005.

insurgents, through ECOWAS and French mediation efforts, a ceasefire agreement between the government and the western rebel groups was signed on 13 January, and the participation of the rebel groups in proposed talks in France was assured.²²

Talks began on 15 January in Linas-Marcoussis, just outside Paris, and ended on 24 January 2003 with an Agreement that was signed by all the parties. The Agreement called for the establishment of a Government of National Reconciliation with wide executive powers, and was to be composed of ministers from the main political parties and the rebel groups on a roughly equal basis, but the current government of President Gbagbo was to be given primacy in the arrangement. Gbagbo was to remain President, but a Prime Minister with wide-ranging powers was to be appointed in agreement with the other groups.

The 24 January 2003 summit at Kléber, Paris, concluded with the endorsement of the appointment of the consensus Prime Minister Elimane Seydou Diarra, a seasoned diplomat, and a former Prime Minister in a previous military regime under Brig. General Robert Guei. The consensus Prime Minister was unable immediately to assume office in Abidjan. There were widespread public demonstrations in Abidjan against the arrangement, but he was eventually inducted into office at Yamoussoukro on the 10th of February 2003.

When the January 2003 peace accord collapsed, the president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki was sent to the Ivory Coast at the behest of the African Union in November 2004.²³ South African President Mbeki firstly travelled to Ivory Coast on December 2, 2004 to meet with the leaders of the warring parties individually in an attempt to renew the foundations of a peace process. Through these meetings, Mbeki was able to obtain pledges to commit to the peace process by all parties. On December 17, the parliament approved a reform measure, which loosened the eligibility requirements for the presidency, which was a key demand of the rebels.

The year, 2004, witnessed many false promises, with both sides failing to complete their sides of the bargain. When French forces neutralized the Ivory Coast Air force, they prevented a full-scale resumption of civil war, but also became tainted as arbitrators. With president Mbeki's involvement, his goal was to prepare the nation for the crucial elections to be held in October 2005.

As 2005 began, the Ivory Coast Government started working on January 6th, without the rebel leaders who abstained for security concerns. On January 11, South African President Thabo Mbeki, embarked on another concerted effort

²² Lansana Giberie and Prosper Addo, Challenges of Peace Implementation in Core d'Ivoire Report on an Expert Workshop by KAIPIC and ZIF, Institute for Security Studies Monograph no 105, August 2004.

²³ Richard Cornwell, "Cote d'Ivoire, A Region at Stake", African Security Review, Vol 14, No 2, 2005, p.48.

to reach a compromise between Gbagbo and the rebels. However, the groups failed to come together at a meeting in the capital of Yamoussoukro.

On 28 February 2005, 87 armed men supporting president Gbagbo attacked a rebel position at Logouale in the west. The attack was stopped by UN peacekeeping troops who detained the attackers. At least 15 people had been killed and 40 injured in the attack on the outpost. Mainly as a result of this event, the UN pledged to send 1200 more peacekeeping troops and extend its mandate. During this time, Mbeki attempted to host another round of peace talks in South Africa, which brought the warring parties together for the first time in 8 months. These negotiations in Pretoria South Africa began on April 2nd and yielded an agreement on 6th of April 2005 between the leaders to immediately and finally cease all hostilities.²⁴ It also reaffirmed October 2005 as the target date for the new presidential election, which would be followed by legislative.

The key part of the negotiation left unresolved was who would be eligible for the October election? Mbeki submitted arbitration saying that all of the participants in the negotiations should be eligible, including RDR leader Alassane Ouattara who was banned from running due to one of his parent's non Ivorian lineage.²⁵ On the 15th of April 2005, two ministers from the rebel camp attended a cabinet meeting at Abidjan, showing support for the new agreement.

What are the significant steps taken by Pretoria? First it should be noted that the agreement, and South African President Thabo Mbeki's mediation, have been saluted by all, from the major Ivorian politicians to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the former colonial power, France. The fact that this is an African agreement already gives it an advantage over Marcoussis, which was French-brokered and thus immediately discredited in many Ivorian eyes.²⁶ If one takes the five major Ivorian leaders - President Gbagbo, main opposition figures Henri Konan Bedie and Alassane Ouattara, rebel leader Guillaume Soro and Prime Minister Seydou Diarra - at their word, they are all happy with what was decided at Pretoria.

The Pretoria Agreement of 6 April 2005 does not seem to include measures of coercion. For example, there is no mention of applying UN sanctions for those who move away from the spirit of the text, though this must still be on the cards. Despite this problem, there is no doubt that President Mbeki has made a substantial number of breakthroughs.

²⁴ Pretoria Agreement on the Peace Process in the Cote d'Ivoire, 6 April 2005, p.1. www.iss.org.za

²⁵ "Disarmament Deal in Ivory Coast", www.bbcworld.com 16 April 2005.

²⁶ James Copnall, "Frail hope emerges from Ivorian deal", www.bbcworld.com, 7 April 2005.

Both sides also agreed upon tentative disarmament starting on 14th of May 2005, which was later set at June 27th. After a presidential decree by Gbagbo permitting RDR Leader Ouattara to run in the election, the date was set for October 30, 2005.

In August 2005, as loyalist militias began to symbolically disarm in preparation for the election a wave of ethnic killings took the lives of more than 41 people in western villages. Revenge killings then accounted for 10 more death by the subsequent day. On August 25 after a series of missed disarmament deadlines and a lack of electoral commission readiness, Mr. Soro declared that the New Forces would not participate in the election planned for October 30, 2005. After this failure, South Africa said it was ending its mediation of the Ivory Coast crisis and blamed the rebel and opposition parties. In the absence of an election plan, the leaders of the Africa Union declared that Gbagbo should remain in office for another year to avoid a constitutional crisis. The U.N. Security Council supported the motion to set the elections back a year at the latest.²⁷

South Africa played very active role in resolving the Ivory Coast conflict. President Mbeki himself worked tirelessly to find a solution to the issue. In this regard, the election process of 30 October 2005 was part of a peace deal brokered by South Africa to end the rift between the rebel-controlled north and the government-held south. So far, despite numerous peace deals, the country remained divided. Earlier transitional governments had failed, rebels and government-allied militias remained armed and 10 000 United Nations and French peacekeepers patrolled front lines.

President Gbagbo's mandate expired on 31 October 2005, but he said the constitution granted him powers to extend it for one year in order to reorganise elections that failed to materialise that year. Under a U.N.-backed plan, Gbagbo was allowed to remain as president beyond the October 30 end of his five-year mandate until presidential elections were held. In the meantime, Charles Konan Banny, former governor of the West Africa Central Bank, was named prime minister. He vested with powers to carry out disarmament and electoral reforms to organize the presidential polls by the end of October of next year.²⁸ Banny have an expanded mandate under a U.N.-backed deal giving him powers to carry out disarmament and electoral reforms with the aim of organizing presidential elections by the end of October 2006.

South Africa's Involvement in Burundi Peace Process

The Burundian issue started in the mid-1990s and formed part of the crisis in the Great Lakes area. In 1996 regional leaders, led by former Tanzanian leader Julius Nyerere, agreed to impose sanctions by regional states on Burundi until

²⁷ "UN Rules out Ivory Coast Election", www.bbcworld.com, 8 September 2005.

²⁸ www.cnn.com, 4 December 2005.

important reforms were instituted. Nyerere then initiated the Arusha Peace Process that was based on inclusive rounds of negotiation and peace talks in support of former President Pierre Buyoya's internal peace process that had commenced in 1996.

As mediator, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere had played a crucial role in pulling the Arusha negotiations together. He remained at the centre of the peace process until his death from a long illness in October 1999. His achievement in facilitating extremely complex negotiations is widely acknowledged.

Following the death of Nyerere, South Africa's involvement in the search for sustainable peace in Burundi began in November 1999,²⁹ when former President Nelson Mandela became mediator in the Arusha peace process. From the moment Mandela took the mediator role in November 1999, he was forceful in garnering support from the international community by highlighting the plight of the Burundian people. In doing so, Mandela intended to culminate international 'legitimacy, backing, and resources' for the peace process.³⁰ Moreover, in line with South Africa's foreign policy approach to the region that regards the Burundi process as part of the general endeavour of bringing peace and stability to Central Africa, Mandela emphasised on the importance of success of the negotiations for the stability of the region as a whole.³¹

By August 2001, with the hard work of Mandela, the various participating parties had signed a peace agreement, Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, which provided for a power-sharing arrangement between Hutus and Tutsis. The Accord provided for a 30-month power-sharing arrangement but many of the details how this was to be implemented were not decided before the signing of the Accord. Therefore, Mandela's role continued in 2001 until they reached an agreement on the nature of the power-sharing agreement. After lengthy negotiations, it was agreed that Pierre Buyoya would act as interim president for 18 months from 1 November 2001, with Ndayizeze as his vice-president, with the later taking over as president on 1 May 2003.³²

It is this accord that has provided the foundation for progress toward a political transition in Burundi. It was widely hoped that this accord had led to a cessation of hostilities between the government and the armed political groups. This accord, it is argued, has been the base for the reconstruction and development

²⁹ Chris Alden and Garth le Pere, *South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy-From Reconciliation to Revival?*, Adelphi Paper 362, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 2003, p.51.

³⁰ Kristina A Bentley and Roger Southall, *An African Peace Process, Mandela, South Africa and Burundi*, HSRC Press: Cape Town, 2005, p.74.

³¹Ibid, p.71.

³² See for the details of the Agreement, *ibid*, p.77-79.

of conflict-torn Burundi.³³ It is also this accord that has provided the foundation for the involvement of South African government in the peace process, notably by the deployment of South African troops.

Although South Africa's peacemaking efforts started earlier in Burundi, its peacekeeping role has come into existence when Pretoria sent its troops there in October 2001. After South Africa sent troops to Burundi, over 30 cabinet ministers and assembly delegates of Burundi received protection during 2002 from a South African Defence Force (SANDF) unit of over 650 soldiers.³⁴ Mainly the South African unit brought in because of the lack of trust most Hutu and some Tutsi politicians in the FAB, the Burundian armed forces. The SANDF deployment was a bold move by the South African government, because initially the FAB had been extremely hostile to even the prospect of foreign deployment in Burundi. In the course of time, Mandela persuaded Defence Minister of Burundi to accept peacekeepers and later the President Buyoya confirmed this acceptance. In addition, on the 29th of 2001, UN Security Council officially backed South African troops in Burundi by a unanimously adopted resolution that allowed creating a temporary international security force.³⁵ Whilst officially operating under the auspices of the AU, South Africa left to assume the sole responsibility for the operation. The mission,³⁶ however, was funded jointly by Belgium and the European Union.

Following the signing of the Arusha Accord in August 2001, Nelson Mandela's role as mediator came to an end. He was no longer officially involved in the Burundi peace negotiations. In 2002, Pretoria attempted to halt the ongoing crisis in Burundi by mediation efforts of then South African Deputy President Jacob Zuma. Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa and President Omar Bongo of Gabon assisted Zuma in his endeavour.

Despite the Arusha breakthrough, some expressed misgivings because the two most powerful protagonists in the conflict, namely the Force for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD FDD) and the National Liberation Forces (FNL), did not take part in the Arusha peace process. After his involvement, Zuma tried to reach a ceasefire agreement between government and rebel groups. In this regard, the talks aimed at securing a ceasefire between the CNDD FDD and the Burundian government supposed to be held in Dar es Salaam in September 2002. This never got off the ground but over the next week, Pretoria's diplomats were hard at work in an attempt to drive the peace process forward.

³³ Ibid, p.1.

³⁴ Gregory Mthembu Salter, 'Burundi: Painstaking Progress', in South African Yearbook of International Affairs 2002/03, the SAIIA, Johannesburg, 2003, p.146.

³⁵ Kristina A Bentley and Roger Southall, *An African Peace Process, Mandela, South Africa and Burundi*, HSRC Press: Cape Town, 2005, p.85.

³⁶ The mission was called officially South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD).

Their efforts seemed to be bearing fruit when in October 2002 the CNDD FDD and the FNL formalised their agreements with transitional government headed by President Pierre Buyoya. During the same year in December, South African diplomats reached another breakthrough when the Burundian government signed a ceasefire accord with the main faction of country's largest rebel group, the CNDD FDD. However, the agreement did not live long and only a week later the ceasefire broke out between the army and the CNDD FDD.

Later on, in order to include them in the process, consultative talks held in Sun City in South Africa 21-24 August 2003. The talks took place between delegations from President Ndayizeye and main rebel group CNDD FDD leader Pierre Nkurunziza respectively and were mediated by Jacob Zuma. Although the talks were the first meeting between Nkurunziza and Ndayizeye since the latter had become president, negotiations reached an impasse concerning the CNDD FDD's demand for a post of second Vice-President. Failure to find agreement around political power sharing did not mean that the meeting was wholly abortive. Considerable progress around the military reform had been reached. The government had indicated willingness to concede immediate command of 16 of the existing 60 battalions to Hutus: 6 to Nkurunziza's CNDD FDD, 6 to Hutus already serving in the army, and the remaining four to other minority rebel groups.³⁷

Throughout the year the intermittent trend of negotiations reached an agreement on 8 October 2003, when Ndayizeye and Nkurunziza announced a deal whereby the transitional government and the CNDD FDD agreed to implement the ceasefire reached in December 2002. The implementation agreement, known as the Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing in Burundi, signed in Pretoria in the presence of South African President Thabo Mbeki and then Deputy President and facilitator Jacob Zuma. According to this agreement, among others, the CNDD FDD would not demand for a second Vice-President, instead it would have four ministries, including a Minister of State for Good Governance. The presidency consult the Minister of State on all key matters and the latter would in effect rank third in state seniority after the President and the Vice-President.³⁸

After bringing the CNDD FDD in the Arusha process, the other main rebel group the FNL was also brought in the process. In this regard, in January 2004, the talks between the Ndayizeye and FNL were facilitated by the Dutch government and subsequently took place in the Netherlands. These were not formal talks because the FNL insisted that they were meeting with Ndayizeye

³⁷ Gasana JM and Boshoff H, *Burundi: Critical Challenges to the Peace Process*, Institute for Security Studies: Pretoria, 2003, p.9-10.

³⁸ See for the details of the Agreement, Kristina A Bentley and Roger Southall, *An African Peace Process, Mandela, South Africa and Burundi*, HSRC Press: Cape Town, 2005, p.112-114.

only as ‘father of the nation’, rather than as president.³⁹ The FNL have not yet recognized the transitional government during the transition process and now newly elected government. It is the only rebel group that excluded itself from the peace process in Burundi.

By January 2003, the fighting spread out the province of Gitega and later on to the capital, Bujumbura. In January 2003, Jacob Zuma lobbied for and received the support of the African Union to deploy an African mission to Burundi.

For this end, the AU Central Organ approved the first ever fully-fledged African Union peacekeeping mission, African Mission to Burundi, on 3 February 2003, and deployed within 60 days after approval. The mandate of AMIB provides for the monitoring and verification of the various Burundi ceasefire agreements, facilitating the Joint Ceasefire Commission and the Technical Committees and supporting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process. AMIB is an integrated mission comprising of a civilian component and military contingents from Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa, with an approved strength of up to 3 335 personnel.

While the AMIB is authorised and deployed under the auspices of the AU, South Africa played a key role in drafting the mandate,⁴⁰ and will have to carry the burden of responsibility for the successful implementation thereof. South Africa is providing the AMIB Force Commander, Major Siphso Binda, and is designated as the leading nation for the mission.⁴¹ This implies a unique responsibility for the conduct of the mission and its ultimate success or failure. AMIB main responsibilities were to disarm rebel groups, feed them and ensure their security, assist their demobilisations, and monitor the peace.⁴²

Though the African Mission to Burundi has started as first ever African Union peacekeeping mission, currently it is operating under the United Nations. In May 2004, after the UN Security Council had acceded recommendation that it should deploy troops to Burundi, it was announced that from 1 June 2004, the AMIB would operate under the UN as part of newly authorized ONUB mission to Burundi. The ONUB would consist of up to 5 650 military personnel with the contribution of Pakistan, Nepal, and Angola.⁴³ It was critical because of the mission’s financial burden on troop contributing countries. The UN has overtaken the financial cost of the AMIB by assuming it as UN troops.

³⁹ Ibid, p.118.

⁴⁰ Vanessa Kent and Mark Malan, *Decisions, Decisions, South Africa’s Foray into Regional Peace Operations*, Institute for Security Studies, Occasional paper 72, April 2003, p.4.

⁴¹ Ibid, p.5.

⁴² Kristina A Bentley and Roger Southall, *An African Peace Process, Mandela, South Africa and Burundi*, HSRC Press: Cape Town, 2005, p.88.

⁴³ Ibid, p.123.

Overall South African peacekeeping deployments in African countries total 2,800 personnel and in the case of Burundi, South African soldiers play a particularly critical role in setting the stage for transition to democracy. South African participated in the Burundian peace negotiations with two cabinet ministers and the deputy-president, and with a degree of civil society engagement such as ACCORD.

In a larger judgment of the Burundian peace process, Kristina et al⁴⁴ observed that Nyerere set in motion the process of beginning to consider the outlines of a settlement in Burundi by warring parties, and Mandela came in to complete the process. Zuma, however, observed the ongoing process and monitored the Arusha Accord's implementation. Zuma's role is widely seen as 'reactive rather than pro-active' in the process.⁴⁵

Overall, South Africa, first in the name of Mandela, and later of Zuma, has played a crucial role in pushing toward a peace process, which became a major milestone on the road toward ending Burundian civil war.

At the end of the peace process, Burundi returned to democracy and held its presidential election in August 2005. After securing majority of the votes, the CNDD FDD leader Pierre Nkurunziza was sworn in as president on 26 August 2005 with the participation of Thabo Mbeki, Jacob Zuma and many other dignitaries.

As South African president Mbeki observed, peacekeeping initiative in Burundi is one of the African-owned initiatives.⁴⁶ From the beginning it had been managed almost exclusively by Africa, with the rest of the world playing supportive role. Finally, the South African efforts to bring peace in Burundi have become successful, this would be seen as a 'proof' that the continent is on its way to reclaim its destiny, and furthermore as an example of 'African solutions for Africa's problems'.⁴⁷

More specifically, it is argued that peace in Burundi is 'one vital piece of a Central African jigsaw'⁴⁸, relating to a much wider peace process that South Africa is busily engaged in constructing. The South African government has also

⁴⁴ Ibid, p.192.

⁴⁵ Ibid, p.159.

⁴⁶ Thabo Mbeki, "Claiming the 21st Century", ANC Today, Vol 5, No 35, 2-8 September 2005, p.2. www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2005/at35.htm accessed 6 September 2005.

⁴⁷ Maxi Schoeman, "Imagining A Community- The African Union as an Emerging Security Community", Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol XXIV, No 1, June 2002, p17.

⁴⁸ Kristina A Bentley and Roger Southall, An African Peace Process, Mandela, South Africa and Burundi, HSRC Press: Cape Town, 2005, p.3.

seen the bringing peace and democracy to Burundi as just one peace, albeit an important one, of far larger jigsaw in Central Africa.⁴⁹

In achieving this in Burundi, South Africa has used its military might as a supportive base. In Du Plessis' words,⁵⁰ Pretoria's Burundi involvement is an example of 'supportive use of the military instrument' (emphasise added) in a peacekeeping operation to advance a peacekeeping process that mainly deals with diplomatic and third party negotiations.

REGIONAL SECURITY, PIVOTAL MIDDLE POWERS AND GLOBAL WORLD ORDER

In retrospect, after every war a new international system has been established. The League of Nations and United Nations both were established as international systems after World War I and World War II, respectively. However, the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union was not followed by any general treaty, thereby creating a legacy in which current rules curiously combine old institutions with the new realities of global politics. Nevertheless, the initial appearance of international order after the Cold War could be characterized as both an integration and disintegration within which different levels of stability exist. In that regard, nationalism and interdependence has become the anathema of post-Cold War environment. As Hall⁵¹ rightly argues, one way of analysing interdependence is to note the recognition given to different kind of nationalisms as a principle of world politics. Religious, regional and civilizational nationalisms are the ones that increased their influence in global political circles and demand to be heard and taken seriously. While the European Union's blocking to undermine subsidy to its agricultural industry in WTO negotiations can be regarded as regional nationalism. The Al-Qaida phenomenon represents the religious nationalism alongside with the Jewish lobby in various countries as representing the other side of the coin.

In current world politics, there are two elements that persist in any endeavour of establishing world order. Without taking both elements seriously, it might not be possible to establish a lasting global world order. First of all, after the 9/11 attacks, the international community was reminded that military expansion no longer brings security.⁵² Nuclear missiles ignore the size of empires and of buffer zones possessed by leading states. This was made clear by the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11, and recent debates on Iran's nuclear debacle.

⁴⁹ Ibid, p.12.

⁵⁰ Anton du Plessis, "The Military Instrument in South African Foreign Policy: A Preliminary Exploration", Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol XXV, No 2, 2003, pp.126-128.

⁵¹ John A. Hall, International Orders, Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1996, p.171.

⁵² Ibid, p.171.

Secondly, the United States as a solely superpower has not lost pre-eminence in defining global politics.⁵³ This can be seen most distinctively the US foreign policy after 9/11. Further, even if the power of the United States does diminish somewhat that may matter far less in global politics than many imagine it in the coming years. The role of the US would be influential in defining the rule of the newly emerging world order. In other words, the period of establishing a new world order would carry the codified code of the American view. How strong and influential that of the US would be on the new world order, entirely depend on two things; how fast the US might diminish its role, and how strong the other players would be.

Bearing all these in mind, any initiative from pivotal middle powers must take the opportunities and obstacles that they may face, if they wish to play an active role in global politics. Their endeavours to make their regions secure must be the first priority for them as well as precondition. Such an approach is also critical for a superpower in creating a new global order. From a pivotal middle powers perspective, having a secure and stable region or backyard will not only increase their hand, but also allow for more time to deal with global issues. Internally and regionally weak pivotal middle powers may not play the expected key role, and therefore, its activities are doomed to be failures. Giving critical roles to pivotal middle powers is also important for super and great powers in their endeavours in creating a lasting world order. Such an approach from super and great powers represents a top-down perspective, similar to 'containment strategy' that was implemented by western bloc during the Cold War to contain the spread of communism.

In current literature, most of the debates and features of the international order have nothing to do with or to say about the vast majority of the countries of the world. One systemic feature of the global order discussions today is that its elements of understandings and the way in which directions are taken, actually draw attention away from the third world. From global participation of the developing world in international bodies and their influence on their ideas to be taken seriously by the west can be called into question. Western powers are of the idea that local and regional dynamics will play themselves out, once the global parameters are settled.

International relations for some years has had a systemic element to it in that the United States has in effect played a key role in decision-making and implementation of the decisions. It has been so on the grounds that the US provides security for global society by actively joining or financing the peacekeeping peacemaking activities, and playing a defining role in the UN Security Council. Therefore, an active role for pivotal middle powers would not be that easy. However, it does not mean that it is worthless. On contrary, this is the way they could exert their influence in a global environment described as

⁵³ Ibid, p.174-175.

unsettled. If pivotal middle powers are able to secure their regions from economic and political crisis, their claim to having a saying in the newly emerging global order will definitely increase. It must be also kept in mind that the imbalances in trained human capital, brain drain, economic development and many other elements that play important roles in developing and implementing ideas, might not privilege some actors in global politics. Such actors in some cases could be pivotal middle powers. Even after taking into account all these imbalances that seem disadvantage to the pivotal middle powers, without their participation, either through contributing to solve regional and local problems or playing active role in global agenda, a stable and lasting world order might not be possible. Even if it is to be so, exclusion of the third world that contains most of the global population is something that any global world order cannot be justified anymore. Especially the current international environment where religious and ethnic nationalism are increasing, it would not be easy to sustain a non-participatory world order.

In today's world, there seem to be two main principle methods to increase pivotal middle powers' leverage in global politics. One is their increasing, and extremely important role in regional security as already explained above. Second option for pivotal middle powers is to act together in global politics whenever possible. Although this is more perplexing and complicated one, it should not be ruled out. In the international arena, one can see the elements of such inclination and it might open for a new understanding of and analysing global politics.

As it is clear that pivotal middle powers in today's global order act according to their own interests, how would it be possible for them to act together on global politics? Or what are the limits of cooperation among them? To answer this question one needs to recognize that all pivotal middle powers have different internal and international environments. By the virtue of their location, each of the pivotal middle powers has to face different regional and internal problems. Most of the pivotal middle powers, due to having spent most of their time searching solutions in their local and internal problems, they either lack sufficient time to think of and formulate a foreign policy directed at global issues or if it is formulated, they cannot find appropriate channels to voice and implement these approaches.

Bearing all this difficulties in mind, it seems that the only way they may cooperate is through what some call 'niche diplomacy'. It simply indicates the kind of co-operations that are based on one concern and from time to time bring pivotal middle powers together issue by issue.

One of the recent opportunities for pivotal middle powers to cooperate was the reform at the United Nations. The so-called G-4 countries made up of Germany, Brazil, India and Japan initiated a process aimed to reform the UN Security Council by increasing the number of permanent members without giving the new members right of veto as the current five have. Although it

failed, this initiative should be taken in future as a pivotal middle powers cooperation. South Africa, the pivotal middle power from the Southern Africa, initially wanted to give support to this so-called G-4 initiative, but failed to gather support from the African Union, which was demanding that the new permanent members should be given the veto right. The G-4 initiative was one of best examples for niche-oriented cooperation recently. Experiences show that focusing on one issue and aiming to reach only one goal seems the best way to act together for pivotal middle powers.

In the wake of 11 September, a chastened North appears more willing to consider development concerns of the South.⁵⁴ In this environment, pivotal middle powers could play the key role not only in defining the South's concerns for poverty eradication, debt relief and the other problems of the South, but also in voicing their concerns in establishing a new world order.

Today, we live in a world where security-economy-politics have become a triangle. Without one of them, it would not be appropriate to analyse or fully understand the others. As recent initiatives of pivotal middle powers in global politics, the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) and India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA) should be mentioned. Although it is not the aim of this paper to deal with them in detail, it is necessary to outline their agendas for a better understanding of possible roles of pivotal middle powers. The New Agenda Coalition came to existence with the aim of accelerating non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction globally but overall it has to deal with every aspects of international security to which it might incline in the years to come. The India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum, however, based its existence on economic imperatives from the beginning to represent the South and advance the agenda of the developing world in the global economic system. After three years of existence, judging from the communiqués released, IBSA has broadened its agenda toward one that is more than *merely* economic. International peace and security, globalisation, reform in global institutions such as UN, terrorism, social development and the fight against diseases such as AIDS might occupy the agenda of the IBSA more frequently. If such pivotal middle power groupings can hold together, without distractions from the third parties, as Taylor⁵⁵ aptly argues, it might have interesting and important implications for global politics, especially on those related to international world order and security.

⁵⁴ Chris Alden and Garth le Pere, *South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy-From Reconciliation to Revival?*, Adelphi Paper 362, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 2003, p.75.

⁵⁵ Ian Taylor, "*South Africa, the G-20, the G-20+ and the IBSA Dialogue Forum: Implications for Future Global Governance*", paper presented at United Nations University conference on "The Ideas-Institutional Nexus Project: The Case of the G-20", Buenos Aires, Argentina, May 19-21, 2004, p.20. available at www.iiis.org.

CONCLUSION

It is increasingly evident that regions want and have always wanted to have more say and representation in global politics. The role of regions increase generally in conditions when there is no absolute, or a less influential dominant power in global economy and politics. Today global politics can be seen as a turmoil, and polarisation of views about the future are often found at times of increasing change in the global political economy. The 20 years between 1971 and 1991 was also such a period. It opened with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods international monetary system, the first major sign of the weakening of United States hegemony, and ended with the collapse of the Communist regime in the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Soviet state. While the end of the Bretton Woods system brought American hegemony into question and inaugurated a time of increasing doubts about US capabilities to sustain the burdens of a global system, conversely, the collapse of the Soviet Union appeared to be left the US with no military and political rivalry.⁵⁶ However, after the so-called truce period (between the collapse of USSR and 9/11), the question about the US' ability, as the sole superpower, to establish a new global order alone, and again its ability to carry the burdens of a newly existing global order brought into question. It is against this background that the possibility of a new perspective on world order might emerge from pivotal middle powers.

One must change the perceptions on two things. First is about the American (or in broader term, western) hegemony and world order, second is about the perception of the West about the East, the Third World, or developing world, whatever one wants to name. Related the first one, the United States, as representative of the west, is no longer hegemonic over capitalist economy in the manner that it achieved in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. But in some fields, particularly the military and cultural, its dominance is greater today than it has ever been. However, having the legitimacy for such values in the eyes of the 'others' is critical at this point, in order to survive an existing domination. As generally argued, legitimacy does not simply depend on the claims of the powerful; it also depends on the active consent of the powerless. When the governance of the world order fails to address the many acute problems which the global politics is facing today, it could increase the already existing legitimacy problem of the West. This in turn might generate an environment conducive to creating a new radical challenge to current order. As Alex de Tocqueville once argued somewhere that, revolutions does not arise when the people are poor or in a very bad conditions, however, it arise mostly when there seem a chance that they can change the system. In a similar vain, the new approaches to global politics and political order will not arise, even if one see more deepening and deteriorating income distribution between haves and have-nots, only it will arise

⁵⁶ Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne (ed), *Regionalism and World Order*, London: Macmillan, 1996, p.249.

when there is a light in the horizon to change it. Pivotal Middle Powers togetherness, if they could do so, might indicate a light in the horizon indicating a pregnancy to challenge the global system. Such PMP initiatives should not be seen as reactive they being left out from global economic politics and institutions.

In post-9/11, in order to capture the global trends, one needs to overcome classical western perception of the 'others'. During the truce period, it is depicted that the Third World is a different type of world. It is one prone to conflict and violence, to a never-ending source of items for the UN agenda. From Robert Kaplan's warning of 'the coming anarchy'⁵⁷ to Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky's analysis of the world dichotomized between the 'zones of peace' and 'zones of turmoil'⁵⁸, have all indicated the coming clash in the Third World areas. Similarly, Stanley Hoffman predicted a New World Disorder located in the Third World, described by a 'situation far more chaotic than the world of the cold war.'⁵⁹

Analysts who predicted that with the demise of cold war society would witness the settling of the issues by armed force have been proven wrong. The ratio of interstate wars in the Third World has been declining notably since about 1975 and comparable to that of several periods in European history.⁶⁰ After the Cold War, the world witnessed conflicts and interstate wars; however, most of them took place either in the areas which is not ordinarily be considered to be part of periphery or third world, such as the two wars the former Yugoslavia, or the west has become part of the war, as is the case in 2003 Iraqi war. While it needs to be recognized that there has been an increasing civil war in the Third World, especially in Africa, the territorial conflicts in the Third World has actually declined after the cold war.⁶¹

If one can analyse the decreasing influence of the West overall, and the increasing demand from the developing world through pivotal middle powers, it

⁵⁷ Robert D Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy", The Atlantic Monthly, 273, 1994, pp.44-76.

⁵⁸ Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, The Real World Order: Zones of Peace/Zones of Turmoil, Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1993.

⁵⁹ Stanley Hoffman, "Watch out for a New World Disorder", International Herald Tribune, 26 February 1991, p.6, quoted by K.J. Holsti, "The Coming Chaos? Armed Conflict in the World's Periphery", in T.V. Paul and John A. Hall (eds), International Order and the Future of World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.290.

⁶⁰ K.J. Holsti, "The Coming Chaos? Armed Conflict in the World's Periphery", in T.V. Paul and John A. Hall (eds), International Order and the Future of World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.292.-293. One needs to remember that not a single war between states in the Third World has threatened the international order. There has been no Third World incarnation of Hitler or Stalin too, except Pol Pot of Cambodia who can be seen more troublemaker domestically rather than globally.

⁶¹ Ibid, p.292.

is not prolific to predict an international order where the developing world play an important role. Especially if they can solve the problems in their backyards, in other words, put their house in order first, their roles are likely to increase in global politics. As a second step, should pivotal middle powers act together, they would be more influential in shaping global politics than ever.