Values in Foreign Policy

Investigating Ideals and Interests

Edited by Krishnan Srinivasan,
James Mayall and Sanjay Pulipaka

ROWMAN &
LITTLEFIELD
INTERNATIONAL
London • New York

Published by Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd
6 Tinworth Street, London SE11 5AL, United Kingdom
www.rowmaninternational.com
Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd.is an affiliate of Rowman & Littlefield
4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706, USA
With additional offices in Boulder, New York, Toronto (Canada), and Plymouth (UK)
www.rowman.com

Selection and editorial matter © 2019 by Krishnan Srinivasan, James Mayall and Sanjay Pulipaka

Copyright in individual chapters is held by the respective chapter authors.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN: HB 978-1-78660-749-2
PB 978-1-78660-750-8

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Srinivasan, Krishnan, 1937– editor. | Mayall, James, editor. | Pulipaka, Sanjay, editor.
Title: Values in foreign policy : investigating ideals and interests / edited by Krishnan Srinivasan, James Mayall, and Sanjay Pulipaka.
Description: Lanham [Maryland] : Rowman & Littlefield International, 2019. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2018056382 (print) | LCCN 2019000337 (ebook) | ISBN 9781786607515 (electronic) | ISBN 9781786607492 | ISBN 9781786607492 (cloth ; alk. paper) | ISBN 9781786607508 (pbk. ; alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: International relations and culture. | Values—Political aspects. | Values—Political aspects—Asia. | Asia—Foreign relations. | Political culture—Asia. | East and West.
Classification: LCC JZ1251 (ebook) | LCC JZ1251 .V35 2019 (print) | DDC 172/.4—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018056382


The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48–1992.

Printed in the United States of America

Chapter 7

Islamic Values in Foreign Policy

Perspectives on 'Secular' Turkey and 'Islamic' Iran

Mehmet Ozkan and Kingshuk Chatterjee

The search for values, of one sort or the other, in foreign policy is an approach fraught with the usual consequences of 'looking for something', for you are likely to find only what you are looking for. To look for Islamic values in foreign policy could well be a case in point. Among scholars of Muslim/Islamic politics, there are those who would subscribe to the position that any action that is professedly inspired by considerations of the faith must ipso facto be accepted as such, unless contrary evidence can be produced – thus all the violent and outrageous actions of Da'ish (or the Islamic State) in the name of Islam should be understood to be 'Islamic'. There are yet others who seem to think actions need not necessarily be professedly Islamic; it is quite enough that they address considerations that are generally associated with the faith or practice of Muslims – hence any expression of solidarity of any predominantly Muslim country for the Palestinian cause has been often read as axiomatic on account of the fact that a majority of Palestinians happen to be Muslims. Still others would choose to shop between these positions, without being beholden to any one argument.

While the literature on the interface between Islamic values and international relations is still sketchy, the question of the role played by religion in international relations has been steadily growing over the past decade and a half. Some have argued that religious phenomena should be investigated at all three levels of independent, intervening (link between cause and effect) and dependent variables (product of non-religious causes) in international politics[1] – that is to say, religious values may condition foreign policy behaviour by causing, facilitating or justifying the course of action undertaken. Others have argued that religious values can be both prescriptive and proscriptive in their effect on foreign policymaking – they might impel a course of action in some direction in accordance with the faith and preclude or make difficult

certain other options.[2] A third approach suggests that political behaviour is socially conditioned (for foreign policy actors are not individuals insulated from the society they live in); thus policy is formulated and played out necessarily within a larger social context in which religion frequently has a definitive role.[3]

In the light of these approaches, how does one identify or decode the Islamic element in a country's foreign policy? Does a foreign policy choice qualify automatically as Islamic if it is merely claimed to be so, since every speech is also reflective of the deliberation behind it?[4] Do all foreign policy choices of an Islamic state tend to be ipso facto Islamic, since the language of politics is heavily laced with Islamic terms of reference? Can a predominantly Muslim state that is not professedly Islamic in its dispensation be motivated by Islamic values in its foreign policy choices, because the societal context within which such policy is framed is heavily influenced by Islamic values, even if the political system is not? Also, whether Shi'i values are different from Sunni values, and, if so, should both qualify as Islamic?

It is useful to understand that it is not possible to essentialize any single set of values (except in very general terms) that can be identified as exclusively Islamic (i.e. found in no other belief system), or even generally understood as such across the Muslim world. The faith and practice of Islam have tended to vary across time and space, much like any other religion or body of ideas, and has tended to acquire distinctive characteristics that make the Muslim world nearly as diverse as any other group of countries in the world. Thus far from all predominantly Muslim countries following similar tropes of political behaviour in the international arena, it is difficult to find any two Muslim countries pursuing similar policies motivated by similar considerations of the faith in exclusion of other factors. Geostrategic, economic and political factors, inter alia, make any exclusively Islamic consideration in foreign policy formulation virtually impossible. And yet quite a number of predominantly Muslim countries tend to claim their policies and actions as being motivated by Islamic values. This could be either because such policies are actually guided by a particular understanding of what Islam is taken to *signify* in a particular situation (i.e., Islamic values are contextual and semiotic in character), or because it is expected/useful to deploy Islamic terms of reference to legitimize any policy or action which may actually have little or no consideration of Islam behind it (i.e., Islamic values are instrumental in character).

In this chapter, the authors propose to deal with these questions for a better understanding of the role Islamic values may or may not play in international politics. It is presented in three sections. The first section deals with a case study of Turkey in the past four decades to explore how the foreign policy of a professedly secular state can nevertheless be argued to be heavily conditioned by Islamic values. The second section deals with a case study of the Islamic

Republic of Iran for nearly the same period in order to contend how despite its professedly Islamic orientation, Iranian foreign policy can be argued to be motivated predominantly by *realpolitik* packaged in the language of political Islam. In the last section an attempt is made to tease out the polyvalence of Islamic values which tend to be signified by different *signifiers* (in this case, policies) using a common set of *signs* (Islamic terms of reference) in the arena of international relations.

TURKEY: Policymaking in a 'Secular' State

Constitutionally, Turkey is a secular state. However, its population happens to be predominantly Sunni Muslim. Since the secular reforms of Ataturk in the 1920s, the state has had a difficult relationship with religion itself and its repercussions in the society. Top-down secularization approach and the policies followed afterwards have not made Turkey more secular (i.e., getting rid of religion from social and political life), but Turkey has become more modern (i.e., opening to the world and following the developments in the world). Turkish society, though, consists of a large number of pious Muslims who have always had a broader perspective. Islam is so embedded in Turkish society and culture that even the most secular Turks continue to derive their sustenance from it.

During the Cold War, Turkish leaders followed a strictly Western orientation in foreign policy, leaving almost no space for religion. Security concerns, the Soviet threat, economic reasons and a state policy to create a secular Turkish identity based on Westernization have denied religion any space, even in cultural terms. The implication of this for foreign policy was that Ankara saw the Middle East as a region not to get involved in actively even though all the Western (i.e., secular) countries had an active Middle East policy. Strangely, talking about the Middle East and speaking Arabic were enough to be considered as following an Islamic perspective on foreign affairs.

Developments following the military coup in 1980 changed the dynamics in Turkey. Coupled with the need to create a 'moderate Islam' urged by the United States in the 1980s, Turkish military coup leaders (such as then President Kenan Evren) began to refer openly to Islam. These references to Islam were no more than paying political lip service to protect Turks from falling prey to the leftists, which seemed a possibility late into the 1970s. Then prime Minister Turgut Ozal (who had a conservative background with a secular leaning) popularized the cultural heritage of Turkey with references to the Ottoman State and liberalized the Turkish economy. Economic liberalization has opened Turkish society to the world and strengthened Turkey's periphery, which is predominantly conservative and pious Muslim in its

orientation. Economic well-being of the periphery later on had repercussions on the political level, and more conservative, more Islamic parties started to rise steadily. The rise of Refah Party in Turkish politics and the premiership of Necmettin Erbakan during 1996–1997 was a shock to the secular establishment in Turkey. Erbakan was removed in a postmodern military coup in 1997; however, Turkish society has never shied away from its desire to live and act in accordance with its deep-seated cultural and religious values. After a turbulent period during 1997–2002, Turkey elected the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) of Recep Tayyip Erdogan to office in Ankara. For many, Erdogan himself and his party are seen as a fusion of traditional (Islam, Ottoman legacy, etc.) and Western values (democracy, human rights, etc.). Since then, Turkey has started to create a balanced foreign policy approach without neglecting religion as an element in foreign policy.

Since AK Party came to power in 2002, there has been a huge transformation in Turkish foreign policy. Until the early 2000s, Turkey had largely followed a one-dimensional foreign policy based on Western orientation despite different push factors coming from society to reach out to different parts of the world such as the Middle East, Africa, Asia and the Balkans. In those years, the state elite mostly acted upon the need to satisfy social pressure whenever a crisis emerged, such as during the Bosnia War, but these shifts were neither deep-rooted nor comprehensive, based rather on ad hoc policies. Since 2002, one can talk about a period of openings to previously neglected regions of the world in Turkish foreign policy to widen Turkey's options in international politics. However, these openings have occurred not only in economic and political terms but also have strong social and religious dimensions. This is a novel phenomenon in Turkey's conventional/traditional approach to foreign and security policy because Turkey is constitutionally a secular state.

The dimension of religious diplomacy has always been underestimated and neglected by the scholars of Turkish politics.[5] Perhaps many considered it only as a natural repercussion and part of a soft power approach,[6] but the time has come for a comprehensive understanding of, and locating religious diplomacy within, the overall structure of Turkish foreign policy. Although until recently this religious diplomacy has not been used much in foreign policy discourse for a variety of reasons, its influence and significance for Turkey's foreign relations during almost the whole of the past decade are worth considering.

While it is not possible to separate the rise, nature and involvement of religious elements from the general tendencies of Turkey's foreign policy, it is possible to evaluate the economic, political and intellectual foundations of this necessity in three basic points. First, Turkey is today looking at its region and the world with a new and different perspective, and as a consequence

there have been radical changes in its approach to Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, Balkans and Asia. According to this new perspective, these regions are not regarded as distant and troubled regions but as possible partners with which relations in political and economic areas ought to be established and developed, and where coordination of action should be undertaken when necessary. For that reason, invoking cultural ties that can be traced back to history and religion wherever possible has become one of the key elements of Turkey's foreign policy normalization.

Second, economic openings are central to Turkey's efforts to reposition itself in a changing global economy. The struggle to redefine a world view, which concentrated on economics, has led the way and laid the foundations for the definitions of a new national role and foreign policy orientation, which have manifested themselves even more during the AK Party era. Under Erdogan's leadership, Turkey now has been trying to develop a new regional and global perspective based especially on historical and cultural components. Ankara's proactive and dynamic openings towards different regions of the world have been systematic and important initiatives rather than being appendages to its relations with the West.[7]

Third, the political foundations of Turkey's openings, which are parallel to the two approaches just mentioned earlier, are to increase Ankara's activities in all regions, international organizations and international relations, and to increase Turkey's activities to contribute to regional and global peace. In that sense, Turkey wants to display an active presence in all international and regional organizations and has determined its foreign policy inclinations within this framework.[8] Turkey's observer status in the African Union, dialogue partnership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, its active stance in the G-20 and its non-permanent member status in the United Nations Security Council during 2008–2010 have to be evaluated within this framework.

Similarly, Ankara's serious interest in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) since 2003 has indicated the intention to utilize religious diplomacy at institutional level as well. Because of this, then Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul announced before the thirty-first meeting of the Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference in May 2004 that Turkey attaches special importance to its relations with the Islamic world, and aimed to get the OIC its deserved place in international arena and transform into a more effective and dynamic structure. With the election of Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu as the OIC secretary-general in 2004, Turkey upgraded its role within the OIC structure to the highest level.[9]

In this new foreign policy framework, the role of religion can be analysed only as a legitimizing or supportive element in Ankara's relations with the world. One should emphasize that Turkey does not follow a religion-based

foreign policy, nor can it do so for constitutional obstacles. However, as long as Turkish society continues to be Muslim, Islam will always have a place. Since 2002, Erdogan has incorporated religion into foreign policy in two forms. First, the Directorate for Religious Affairs (*Diyanet*), a state institution established in 1924 to observe and control the Muslims by managing mosques and shaping a discourse suitable to the state, has transformed itself into an international actor, facilitating and contributing to Turkish foreign policy.

Diyanet has organized religious leaders' meetings with Africa, Latin America, Eurasia and Balkans as part of Turkey's opening in those regions.[10] *Diyanet*, for the first time, organized a Summit of Latin American Religious Leaders in Istanbul in November 2014 with a total of seventy-one people from forty countries in attendance. Not only had community leaders participated from key countries like Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and Colombia, but there had also been representatives from small countries like Belize and Barbados among the invitees. One of the main aims of the summit was to establish links and share experiences. Because of this, most of the topics discussed had been related to the understanding and identification of problems that Latin American Muslims face. *Diyanet*'s summit cannot be understood without contextualizing the political opening of Turkey to Latin America in the past decade. Since the announcement of 2006 as 'the Year of Latin America' in Turkey, Turkish foreign policymakers have placed a special emphasis on Latin America. Ankara has opened new embassies, and mutual visits have intensified.[11]

Similarly, *Diyanet* organized the first Religious Leaders Meeting of African Continent Muslim Countries and Societies in Istanbul in November 2006 in which representatives from twenty-one countries participated. The second meeting took place in Istanbul and Ankara between 21 and 25 November 2011. In this meeting, Muslim religious authorities from Africa had called on Turkey to take a greater role in Islamic education in African communities. In a joint declaration, they urged that educational institutions similar to the Imam-Hatip schools[12] in Turkey should be used 'as an example for schools in Africa and backed with faculties providing higher religious education like [Turkey's] theology faculties'.[13] These meetings have been part of Turkey's opening to Africa policy since 2005. Turkey has now thirty-nine embassies in Africa (it had only twelve in 2002), and trade between Turkey and Africa has tripled since 2002.[14]

Diyanet continues to play a similar role in Balkans and Eurasia by educating, financing and bringing religious leaders together. In Turkey, *Diyanet* is no longer seen as a simple state institution; rather it holds now more respect and credibility than ever historically among Turkish society.

The second way in which Turkey incorporated religion into foreign policy is by taking demands of Turkish society into consideration with regard to developments in the world. One can call this an Islam-sensitive foreign policy, but not an Islamic one per se. Whatever happens to Muslims in Palestine, Myanmar, Balkans or Africa, the Turkish government has acted fast and in most cases is leading the process. This has expanded Turkey's and Erdogan's popularity as Muslim statesman among the broader Islamic world. If Turkey today commands respect and admiration among the general public in Muslim countries, it cannot be explained only by the economic success of a Muslim country blending modernization with Islam successfully; it is also related directly to Turkey's Islam-sensitive approach to developments.

Despite the increasing role of *Diyanet* as an actor in foreign policy and existence of Ankara's Islamic-sensitive policies, it is difficult to argue that Turkey follows an Islamic foreign policy. Indeed, there is no definition of what qualifies a policy as 'Islamic' in the world today. The Turkish case, based on the past two decades, suggests that rather than looking for Islamic components in the foreign policy of any country, it is better to search for how sensitivity towards Islam and its values get reflected in a state's foreign policy. The Turkish case suggests that any exaggerated discourse on Islam and Muslims as an imminent danger/threat in international politics should now be put to an end. A predominantly Muslim country can create an 'Islamic' foreign policy by taking into account religious and cultural values with modern diplomatic rationality and the economic and political needs of its citizens without jeopardizing the global order.

IRAN:
Policymaking in a 'Religious' State

Unlike Turkey, Iran is professedly an Islamic state. The Islamic Republic of Iran came into being as a result of the Iranian Revolution of 1979. In the three decades and a half that have elapsed since then, it has often been claimed that Tehran's foreign policy manifests a deep ideological commitment to Ithna 'Ashari Shi'i Islam, the official ideology of the Islamic Republic. At a pinch, Iranian foreign policy could be taken to indicate a fascinating convergence between Islamic and strategic considerations.[15] While it is difficult to make the case that all policy formulations are necessarily guided by Islamic considerations, most of them are articulated in terms of these. In other cases, Islamic considerations are believed to have imposed limitations on the courses of action to be pursued. Thus, Iranian foreign policy exhibits attributes of Islamic values both in an instrumental sense and in terms of sensibilities to be (or appearing to be) addressed.

The impact of Tehran's Islamic orientation is argued to have been most readily discernible in the Levantine region of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, as also in its apparently implacable hostility to United States and Israel. Iran's Arab neighbours, in particular the Saudi kingdom and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have contended that Tehran aims at establishing a Shi'i axis of influence in the region. Since 1983, Tehran has provided the militant Hizballah movement with financial, military, logistic and political support.[16] After the end of the Lebanese civil war, Iran has continued to provide Hizballah with logistical support to emerge as the principal force of opposition in Lebanon, and Hizballah's television and propaganda network, Al-Manar, was set up with support from Iran.[17] Iran has also been involved in the Israeli-Palestine conflict since the latter part of the 1980s. Tehran has financed and possibly also trained the Hamas since the late 1980s, and definitely since the mid-1990s.[18] Since 2012, Tehran, along with Russia, has effectively salvaged the embattled Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, locked into a civil war with a myriad group of his own countrymen disgruntled with the regime. Additionally, Tehran's role in the Shi'i-dominated Iraqi government's successful struggle with the Da'ish has given it a degree of leverage in Baghdad that is second to none. All these are considered to be part of a steady programme for regional domination by the Islamic Republic, which is believed to be flourishing at the expense of the traditional Sunni orientation of almost all countries of the region. Of late, Iran is believed to have supported the Houthi rebels, with both money and arms, in the civil war in Yemen.

However, any observer of the political dynamics of the Middle East would discern major continuities between the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic and the Pahlavi regime it had overthrown. The suspicion of an agenda for regional domination that Riyadh, Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Manama and Abu Dhabi harbour against the Islamic Republic today echoes similar suspicions about the rulers of the Pahlavi dynasty (1925–1979). In terms of its territorial ambition, the Islamic Republic is every bit as much a status quo power as its predecessor used to be – be it regarding the contested claims over the Caspian Sea (with first the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and then the successor states), the frontier with Iraq along the Shatt al-Arab waterways (which caused frictions for the whole of the twentieth century and war in the 1980s) or the possession of the Abu Musa and Tunb islands (which Tehran holds and UAE claims).[19] All through the 1930s, and then from the 1950s to the 1970s, Iran vied for regional domination with Cairo, Ankara and (from the 1970s) Riyadh – much as it is now suspected of doing for the past decade or so.

In fact, much of Iran's 'revolutionary' adventurism in its neighbourhood is susceptible of a geopolitical explanation. The war with Iraq (1980–1987) saw Tehran completely isolated in the neighbourhood with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE and the United States actively supporting Iraq at various

stages of its war effort in various ways. Tehran broke out of this diplomatic isolation by turning to Damascus at a time when Syria's intervention in the Lebanese civil war had isolated Damascus from the West and its Arab neighbours. Tehran began supporting Syria and then the Hizballah, after they began fighting Israel in Lebanon, principally in order to open a second front that could distract American interest and therefore concentrate less on Iraq.[20] Iran's interest in the Hamas also was presumably driven by similar concerns of keeping the second front open after the Lebanese civil war was over; US preoccupation with the Arab-Israeli dispute would serve to reduce the heat on Iran. Additionally, in the light of the funding of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War by Arab governments in the name of Arab solidarity, Tehran's espousal of the Palestinian cause was meant to send a powerful message to the Arab streets, that on the crucial question of Palestine, Tehran remained more true to the Arab cause than all the Arab regimes. This also explains the relentless hostility (albeit muted, except during the presidency of Ahmedinejad) that the Islamic Republic has been showing to Israel over the past three decades. Tehran clearly targets Israel in order to hurt the United States, by keeping the option of opening a second front at hand. This is why military support for Hamas and Hizballah from Iran escalated whenever Tehran came under international (read US) pressure on any issue (as in the 1980s, between 1994 and 1996, during 2003, and 2006–2008).[21]

Geopolitics can also explain Iran's interest in creating a series of Shi‘i centres of power in the Arab heartland by propping up various Shi‘i forces in Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain and Yemen.[22] Indeed, Tehran appears to believe that its best chances of success in regional politics would come with strengthening the Shi‘i (‘Alavid, Ithna ‘Ashari or Zaidi) elements in regional politics that have been hitherto repressed by the Sunni ruling classes. Even if such Shi‘i opposition does not come to power, their mere existence weakens Tehran's neighbouring Sunni states somewhat.[23] Iran would prefer a weak neighbour to a strong neighbour, and a stable neighbour to an unstable one.

In large measure, the urge to seek an ideological rationale behind the Islamic Republic's foreign policy stems from its own pronouncements right from 1979. In a major departure from the Pahlavi regime, the revolutionary order identified early on the United States and Israel as the *mustakbirun* (literally, arrogant ones, implying oppressors),[24] referred to as the Greater and Lesser Evils (*Shaitan-e Bozorg, Shaitan-e Kochak*), respectively, using semi-Islamic terminology, occasioning a running undercurrent of hostility and tension. The moves towards Syria and Lebanon were justified as keenness of the revolutionary regime to support the *mazlum-ha* or *mustadhafun* (the oppressed) in their struggle against the *mustakbirun* with the ‘Alawite Shi‘i rulers of Syria and the Shi‘i organization of Hizballah in Lebanon being

natural constituencies for Tehran. Tehran's support for the predominantly Sunni Palestinians (and later, specifically, the Hamas movement) in Israel was justified by saying that Zionism was an offshoot of Western imperialism; hence it was incumbent upon the Islamic Republic to support the Palestinians till they were free.[25]

One of the most distinctive features of the 1979 revolution, which is seldom discussed any longer, was that revolutionary order was *Islamized* in course of the months after the toppling of the previous regime.[26] In the chaos that followed the abdication of the Shah and the return of Ayatollah Khomeini from exile, protagonists of constitutional democratic order were progressively marginalized by more radical revolutionaries who captured in the name of Islam the various institutional structures left standing. By October 1979, the initial (and more liberal democratic) constitution was replaced by a more Islamic constitution, deriving its rationale from Ayatollah Khomeini's own views on the matter. However, this process of Islamization was thoroughly contested by other stakeholders in the revolution. The Islamic radicals used first the bogey of the US-Israel axis and later the Iraq War as a smokescreen to eliminate much of this political dissent in the months and years that followed. One of the major instruments in this regard was the progressive Islamization of the language of politics and legitimacy in the Islamic Republic – to the extent that policies and measures could be proposed or opposed as long as Islamic terms of reference were deployed.[27] With the opposition to the Islamist forces eliminated, driven into exile, rehabilitated in or marginalized by the revolutionary dispensation, by the time the Iraq War came to an end and normal politics resumed, the terms of reference in Iranian political discourse were virtually completely Islamized, with foreign policy being no exception.

During the revolution, apprehensions abounded about the role of the United States and Israel, allies of the previous regime, who were therefore identified as the *mustakbirun*.[28] The more radical elements among the revolutionaries were at odds with the efforts of the provisional government led by Mehdi Bazargan to negotiate an understanding of sorts with the United States. The resultant seizure of the US embassy in Tehran by the radical elements, and the US response to it, pushed Tehran down a belligerent path that has now become a rut. At least two Iranian presidents (Khatami and Rouhani) have tried to break out of this rut, and each time their opponents decried such efforts as a betrayal of the Islamic Revolution.[29]

Much of the revolutionary ranting about the United States, the United Kingdom and Israel was formulated in terms of Western conspiracies to retain their stranglehold on the lives of Muslims and the need to wage *jihad* against these – an argument that was sold easily to Iranians brought up with stories of Western penetration of the Iranian economy in the nineteenth century. When Muslim-ruled Iraq invaded Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini responded

by identifying the Ba'athist ideology of Iraq as (a hypocrite who pretends to adhere to Islam), and hence the war against it as a *jihad-e defai* (a struggle waged in defence of Islam) or *jihad fi sabil Allah* (Jihad in the Path of God) to reclaim territory belonging to the Islamic Republic.[30] By 1983, as Iran successfully drove the Iraqis out of Iranian territory, the question was whether Iran should press home its advantage at the expense of the suffering of the Muslims of Iraq. Those who argued for pushing on called for a *jihad-e ibteda'i* (an initiatory or pre-emptive struggle) – a category that had no previous currency.[31]

To a large extent, values discernible in the realm of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic are products of Islamization of the language of politics. The Islamic character of the dispensation requires the regime to voice solidarity with Muslims elsewhere.[32] Hence when the Soviet Union collapsed, Tehran provided crucial support for the Central Asian Republics to find their feet on the ground. The Islamic Republic takes exception to violence perpetrated against Muslims around the world, expressing solidarity for Palestinians and Lebanese, Kashmiris and Rohingyas.[33] Tehran also works to promote well-being in Muslim countries, for instance by promoting polio-inoculation in Bangladesh through the state-owned broadcasting agency, and has sent aid to Myanmar to help rehabilitate the Rohingyas in that country.[34]

However, it is difficult to argue that Islamic principles in foreign policy trump *realpolitik*. A good illustration is the Kashmir question. During the Iran-Iraq War, New Delhi remained closer to Baghdad, which occasioned Tehran to extend diplomatic support to Islamabad on the Kashmir issue in forums like the OIC. However, from the days of Rafsanjani, as Tehran's relationship with Delhi improved, the Islamic Republic persistently refrained from criticizing Delhi in international forums at a time when Kashmiri insurgency and the Indian response were under international scrutiny.[35] Tehran briefly resumed its support of Pakistan's attempts to internationalize the Kashmir issue after India voted against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2008,[36] and has of late raised the issue, wary of India's increasing affinity with Iran's Arab Gulf neighbours. Clearly, an Islamic argument is stronger once the decision is already arrived at for non-Islamic considerations.

It is, thus, difficult to make the case that Islamic values weigh effectively in the making of foreign policy in the Islamic Republic, but more often Islamic terms of references are deployed for the instrumental value they possess within the context of an Islamized political discourse. The regime rationalizes its measures in Islamic terms either in conforming to the expectations that the people of a Muslim society are believed to have from an Islamic regime, as in supporting the oppressed Muslim people of Palestine, or from the urge to

be *adequately* Islamic.[37] It is thus moot whether a Muslim country necessarily resorts to Islamic values, or whether it appears to do so because the political discourse has been Islamized.

State and Islam in Foreign Policy

In looking for religious values in foreign policy, one should look at least from two perspectives: first, whether the country itself considers, uses or resorts to religion as an element in foreign policy; second, how others perceive the element of religion operating in that country's policymaking.

The two case studies of Turkey and Iran show that being a constitutionally secular state (Turkey) or a professedly religious state (Iran) does not make much difference for religion as a factor in foreign policy. Both cases show that in formulating foreign policy, geopolitical considerations, *realpolitik* and political/economic gains continue to have greater weightage. Religion shows itself as an element to legitimize, support, and in some cases a discourse to be utilized, to galvanize domestic support. By and large, both Turkey and Iran have resorted to the language of Islam, albeit differently in differing circumstances since the early 1980s. Depending on regional and international conditions, the role of religion in foreign policy discourse has tended to fluctuate. Turkey, especially since Erdogan came to power in 2002, has added religion as yet another element in shaping its foreign relations. Public sensitivity about being Muslim has begun to be reflected in political language and discourse. Iran, despite being a religious state, is known for its *realpolitik* approach to regional and global politics. As indicated, there is a noticeable continuity in the foreign policy goals of Iran. National issues unite all segments of Iranians irrespective of their religious or secular orientation. For example, the nuclear issue is known to have the elicited support of a large section of both the secular and religious segments of Iranian society.[38]

It is interesting to see how the religious element is believed to influence the foreign policies of Turkey and Iran. Many of the observers maintain, and many people in the Muslim world expect, that the Islamic Republic of Iran prioritizes considerations of Muslims as an important element in foreign policy. Similarly many hold that Turkey, a secular country aspiring to join the European Union, should not use religion at all in foreign affairs, even though secular Turkey's President Erdogan is considered the most powerful Muslim leader from whom Muslims in distress may seek help. Ironically, thus, from a comparative perspective on Iran and Turkey, many in the Muslim world see constitutionally secular Turkey as more religious in its approach to foreign policy towards Muslims than Iran, that is often seen as more sectarian.

There are still others who simply see in the Islamic or religious terms of reference nothing more than a legitimizing instrument within the larger rubric

of the prevalent political discourse. Both Turkey and Iran happen to routinely engage in diplomatic relations with other countries, both Muslim (Shiʻi and Sunni) and non-Muslim. When they deal with non-Muslim countries, policies are seldom marketed as of Islamic vintage, except to the domestic audience where such labelling is believed to have some traction. Hence both Turkey (since the late 1990s) and Iran (since 1979) have publicly chosen to thunder against Israel on the question of Palestine where many, but not all, happen to be Muslims. Such assertion of solidarity does not either necessarily or readily translate into material support for Muslim brethren. Turkey has proven wary of actively involving itself with such causes unless they are affected directly. Hence Ankara initially tacitly supported the (Sunni Islamist) opposition to Assad but chose to reverse its policy when the Kurdish regions of Syria began to pose an irredentist challenge and appears to have reconciled with Assad remaining in power.[39] Similarly, Ankara stayed away from the Iraqi quagmire even at the height of the threat posed by the Daʻish till the prospect emerged of Syria unravelling altogether, which raised the prospect of Kurdish irredentism, and Ankara resorted to unilateral military action inside Iraq in March 2018.[40] On conflict situations away from its neighbourhood, Turkey has refrained from venturing out in the name of Islam. Ankara's only such military involvement outside its immediate neighbourhood in recent times (viz. Afghanistan) was as a part of NATO obligations. Despite Ankara's best efforts there to project itself as a key Muslim interlocutor, its investments are yet to pay off noticeably.[41]

Similar considerations of *realpolitik* in Iran's policy towards Iraq and Palestine have previously been discussed. It needs to be spelt out that the apparently sectarian character of the Islamic Republic also is a kind of optical illusion or window-dressing. In Iraq, Tehran tried to strengthen the Shiʻi forces at the expense of the Sunnis because the latter were integral to the Baʻathist regime that had been hostile to the Islamic Republic. The alleged Shiʻi connection in Syria and Yemen also appears somewhat puerile because from the standpoint of Ithna ʻAshari Shiʻi theology prevalent in Iran, both the ʻAlavi Shiʻi (from which comes Bashar al-Assad) and the Zaidi Shiʻi (who make up most of Yemen's Shiʻi population) are situated at different levels of *bidʻa* (heresy). Besides, unlike Syria, Tehran's support for the Shiʻi of Yemen is of recent vintage. There were no noticeable intimacies between Tehran and the Shiʻi during the days of ʻAli Abdullah Saleh, which should not have been the case if the idea of a Shiʻi axis was actually religious/sectarian in character.

That said, it is equally facile to deny the role played by Islam in the realm of diplomacy in the Muslim world. Periodic scholarly conferences and increasing academic exchanges on Islamic themes have gained substantial currency over the past several decades – both Ankara and Tehran use these *carpe diem* situations to engage with those parts of the world where Muslims are

not in a majority. Tehran's role in organizing annual musical performances of the works of Amir Khusrau in India, or scholarships to Muslim students from South, Central and Southeast Asia, such as those provided by the Al-Mustafa International University of Qom or the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance, has a major value in the realm of Track-II diplomatic engagement with these parts of the Muslim world. Turkey has similarly developed such networks over the past two decades in Africa and South and Central Asia – this explains why the schools associated with the Gülen network have been taken over by the Turkish state after the coup attempt in July 2016, rather than being shut down.[42] Whether these networks would allow Ankara and Tehran the same kind of mileage in the future that the United States has with Fulbright and the UK with the British Council, or even China with its Confucius scholarships, would depend on the total volume of money pumped in over a period of time.

CONCLUSION

This chapter suggests that deep-seated cultural and religious elements often produce certain strategic perspectives that inform state action, in particular historical conjunctures, subsumed within the broader rubric of values. Such factors derived from the intellectual and cultural tradition of Islam, varying across time and space, influence the grand strategy of countries of the Muslim world as profoundly as they do in other cultural spaces. They influence how governments employ domestic and international resources of a state towards the accomplishment of overarching national and global goals. This in turn may result in defining what will be the priorities of foreign policy tenets in terms of issue or region/area of focus, which becomes pivotal to foreign policy decision making.

In terms of analysing a country's foreign policy, this chapter argued that the religious element in foreign policymaking can be neglected only to weaken the analysis. Foreign policy analysis has often concentrated only on what has come to occur, rather than the intellectual parameters within which the policies were formulated. By bringing cultural and religious elements into the analysis, and understanding the boundaries of thinking within which political actors operate, one can explain developments better and project a range of possible outcomes.

Important contributions have already been made in terms of arguing that the global resurgence of religion challenges hegemonic concepts and thought patterns of the study of international relations (IR). Beyond observing the religious challenge to the secular foundations of IR as a discipline, one needs to illuminate paths to integrate non-biased concepts of religion into analyses

carried out within IR.[43] In that sense, Eva Bellin argues, 'understanding the role of religion in international politics requires grasping its *meaning* for believers' and '*understanding* precludes *explanation*'.[44] She recommends, first, that 'students of religion in IR should aim for interpretive narratives, not for predictive sciences',[45] and, second, they 'need to focus more on developing empirically grounded middle-range theory'.[46]

As in the cases of Turkey and Iran, in today's world the role of religion is not considered by many of its practitioners as incongruous to foreign policy. There are now increasing calls for an inclusion of religions and religious diplomacy for peace processes, problem solving and other areas of foreign policy.[47] Turkey has already considered and followed this line and included religious diplomacy as part and parcel of foreign policy since the early 2000s. Today with the change towards a multidimensional approach to foreign policy, religion has become one of Turkey's new tools in implementing its vision and policies. Iran, in its own way, has been doing so since the Islamic Revolution in 1979.

Today, unlike in the past, religious diplomacy has acquired a much more sophisticated and comprehensive form. Given the political success of forces deploying a language of politics derived from Islam, institutions that implement and develop religious diplomacy in Turkey and Iran have begun to evolve. *Diyanet* is no longer a state body to cater to religious needs of Turkish citizens alone; rather it is one of the flagbearers of Turkey abroad. Similarly for Iran, the Ministry for Islamic Culture and Guidance and several other such instruments, institutions and channels are deployed by Tehran to exert religious influence in different parts of the world. In coming years, it is extremely likely that the use of Islam and the political language of Islam in diplomatic activities of both Iran and Turkey will continue to expand in scope as both a source of inspiration for policy formulation and the language of legitimacy.

NOTES

1. Nukhet A. Sandal and Patrick James, 'Religion and International Relations Theory: Towards a Mutual Understanding', *European Journal of International Relations* 17, no. 1 (March 2011): 6.
2. Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, *Bringing Religion into International Relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 58.
3. See Mehmet Ozkan, *Religion, Historical Legacy and Weltanschauungs: The Cases of Turkey, India and South Africa* (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Seville, 2013): 48–50; See also Michael Barnett, 'Another Great Awakening? International Relations Theory and Religion', in Jack Snyder (ed.). *Religion and International Relations Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 91–114.

4. For a discussion on how every speech is also an ‘act’ in itself, see John Searle, ‘How Performatives Work’, *Linguistics and Philosophy* 12, no. 5 (October, 1989): 535–58. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25001359.

5. Mehmet Aydın, ‘*Diyanet’s* Global Vision’, *The Muslim World* 98, no. 2–3, (2008): 164–72.

6. Ibrahim Kalın, ‘Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey’, *Perceptions* XVI, no. 3 (2011): 5–23.

7. Ahmet Davutoğlu, ‘Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007’, *Insight Turkey* 10, no. 1 (2008): 77–96.

8. Ahmet Davutoğlu, ‘Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy’. Address by foreign minister of Republic of Turkey at the SETA Foundation’s Washington, DC Branch (8 December 2009). http://www.setadc.org/images/stories/food/FM%20of%20Turkey%20A.Davutoglu%20Address%20at%20SETA-DC%2012-08-2009.pdf.

9. Mehmet Ozkan, ‘Turkey in the Islamic World: An Institutional Perspective’, *Turkish Review of Middle East Studies* 18 (2007): 159–93.

10. This section on the rise of *Diyanet* in Turkey’s foreing policy is summarized from Mehmet Ozkan, ‘Turkey’s Religious Diplomacy’, *The Arab World Geographer* 17, no. 3 (2014): 223–37.

11. Ariel Levaggi, ‘Turkey and Latin America: A New Horizon for a Strategic Relationship’, *Perceptions* XVIII, no. 4 (2013): 99–116.

12. Imam-Hatip Schools are public vocational schools with a curriculum of both Islamic education and modern sciences. Originally established to cater to the need of producing religious leaders (*imams)* in the mosques by the secular establishment, they have come to provide exposure to Western education without neglecting Islamic/cultural values. See Irem Ozgur, *Islamic Schools in Modern Turkey: Faith, Politics, and Education* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

13. Quoted in ‘Africa Seeks Turkish Islamic Education’, *Hurriyet Daily* (24 November 2011).

14. For more on this, see Mehmet Ozkan, ‘Turkey’s Political-Economic Engagement with Africa’, in Justin van der Merwe, Ian Taylor and Alexandra Arkhangelskaya (eds.). *Emerging Powers in Africa: A New Wave in the Relationship?* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 217–31.

15. R. K. Ramazani, ‘Iran’s Foreign Policy: Independence, Freedom and the Islamic Republic’, in Anoushiravan Ehtesami and Mahjoob Zweiri (eds.). *Iranian Foreign Policy: From Khatami to Ahmedinejad* (Reading, MA: Ithaca Press, 2008), 1–16.

16. See, Anthony H. Cordesman, ‘Iran’s Support for the Hezbollah in Lebanon’, *Center for Strategic and International Studies* (15 July 2006). http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060715_hezbollah.pdf.

17. Ibrahim Mousawi, Director, Political Programmes, Al-Manar Television, in conversation with one of the authors, Beirut, May 2005.

18. US sources have estimated Iranian support to Hamas has ranged between $30 million and $50 million during the 1990s; Canadian intelligence estimates the transfer for the same period to have been between $3 million and $18 million. Matthew Levitt, *HAMAS: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad* (New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 2006), 172.

19. Kingshuk Chatterjee, ‘The “Tehran” Factor: Doomed to Destabilise?’ in Priya Singh and Sushmita Bhattacharya (eds.). *Perspectives on West Asia: The Evolving Geopolitical Discourses* (Kolkata and New Delhi: Makaias and Shipra Publications, 2012), 116–20.

20. For a detailed argument along these lines, see Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System* (London; New York: Routledge, 1997).

21. Chatterjee, ‘the “Tehran” Factor’. 122–23.

22. Anoushiravan Ehteshami, ‘Iran’s Regional Policies since the End of the Cold War’, in Ali Gheissari (ed.). *Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, Politics* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 345

23. For instance, see Mohsen M. Milani, ‘Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy in the Post-Saddam Era’, in Ali Gheissari (ed.). *Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, Politics* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 359–63; See also, Kayhan Barzegar, ‘Iran’s Foreign Policy Strategy after Saddam’, *The Washington Quarterly* 33, no. 1 (January 2010): 173–89.

24. In Islamic theology, the *mustakbirun* were those like Iblis or the Pharaohs who were too arrogant to accept the Revelation, God and His Prophet. Khomeini used this term to depict the Shah and all who had supported him, implying a lack of political legitimacy being equivalent to infidelity.

25. A. H. Rafsanjani, in *Dar Maktab-i Jum‘a*: *Muajmu‘a Khutbaha-ye Namaz-i Juma‘a-ye Tehran*, 6 (Tehran: Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance, 1990), 10, cited in Saskia Gieling, *Religion and War in Revolutionary Iran* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), 143.

26. Shaul Bakhash. *The Reign of the Ayatollahs*: *Iran and the Islamic Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

27. Kingshuk Chatterjee, ‘Of Islam and Other Things: The Drivers and Rhetoric in Iranian Politics’, in Priya Singh (ed.). *Re-envisaging West Asia: Looking beyond the Arab Uprisings* (Kolkata and New Delhi: Makaias and Shipra Publications, 2016), 56–84.

28. Gieling, *Religion and War in Revolutionary Iran*, 88

29. Rouhani’s efforts during the closing months of the Obama era resulted in the nuclear deal. For a discussion of Khatami’s efforts to normalize relations, see Kingshuk Chatterjee, *A Spilt in the Middle: The Making of the Political Centre in Iran 1987–2004*, IFPS/CPWAS Occasional Paper, no. 2 (New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2012): 43–45.

30. *Ettela‘at*, 21st Esfand 1360/ 3 March, 1983.

31. Gieling, *Religion and War in Revolutionary Iran*, 84–86.

32. Ibid., 143–44.

33. See, Ayatollah Khamenei’s ‘Id speech ‘Why Is the World Silent towards Massacre of Muslims in Myanmar, Kashmir and Palestine’, *Khamenei.ir* (29 August 2017). http://english.khamenei.ir/news/5088/Ayatollah-Khamenei-Why-is-world-silent-towards-massacre-of-Muslims.

34. ‘Iran Distributes Humanitarian Aid to Rohingya Refugees’, *Mehr News Agency* (17 September 2017). https://en.mehrnews.com/news/127871/Iran-distributes-humanitarian-aid-to-Rohingya-refugees.

35. Muhammad Faysal, 'How Rafsanjani Sabotaged the Kashmir Cause to Save India', *With Kashmir* (9 January 2017). http://withkashmir.org/2017/01/09/rafsanjani-sabotaged-kashmir-cause-save-india-1994-updated/.

36. Iftikhar Gilani, 'How Iran Saved India in 1994', *Milli Gazette* (19 January 2011). http://www.milligazette.com/news/333-how-iran-saved-india-in-1994-kashmir-UN-voting.

37. The best example is the case of the *fatwa* on Salman Rushdie, on account of his book *the Satanic Verses*, which Ayatollah Khomeini is believed to have initially suggested should be ignored. It is argued that coming under attack from the right-wing conservative elements of the revolutionary elite on domestic issues, Khomeini changed his mind and issued the *fatwa* on Rushdie and his book largely to pre-empt any challenge to his position within the Islamic Republic, unmindful of the consequences Tehran had to face for years to follow. See Baqer Moin, *Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah* (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999), 282–85.

38. See Saideh Lotfian, 'Nuclear Policy and International Relations', in Homa Katouzian and Hossein Shahidi. *Iran in the 21st Century: Politics, Economics and Conflict* (London: Routledge, 2008), 158–80.

39. Alexander Christie-Miller, 'Turkey's Policy Shift in Syria Reflects New Priorities', *The National* (16 April 2018). https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/turkey-s-policy-shift-in-syria-reflects-new-priorities-1.722147.

40. Mohamed Mostafa, 'Iraq Denounces Turkish Strikes on Kurdistan That Left Civilians Dead', *Iraqi News* (22 March 2018). https://www.iraqinews.com/features/iraq-denounces-turkish-strikes-on-kurdistan-that-left-civilians-dead/.

41. Masood Saifullah, 'Is Turkey's Erdogan Seeking a Leading Role in Afghanistan?' *Deutschewelle* (6 July 2017). https://www.dw.com/en/is-turkeys-erdogan-seeking-a-leading-role-in-afghanistan/a-39575830.

42. 'Turkish Foundation Takes Over 108 Gülen-Linked Schools Abroad', *Hurriyet Daily News* (24 April 2018). http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-foundation-takes-over-108-gulen-linked-schools-abroad-130823.

43. Mona Kanwal Sheikh, 'How Does Religion Matter? Pathways to Religion in International Relations', *Review of International Studies* 38, no. 2 (2012): 366.

44. Eva Bellin, 'Faith in Politics: New Trends in the Study of Religion and Politics', *World Politics* 60, no. 2 (2008): 343.

45. Ibid., 343.

46. Ibid., 346.

47. Peter Mandaville and Sara Silvestri, *Integrating Religious Engagement into Diplomacy: Challenges and Opportunities* (Brookings Papers No. 67: 2015).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aydın, Mehmet. '*Diyanet's* Global Vision'. *The Muslim World* 98, no. 2–3 (2008): 164–72.

Bakhash, Shau. *The Reign of the Ayatollahs*: *Iran and the Islamic Revolution*. New York: Basic Books, 1984.

Barnett, Michael. ‘Another Great Awakening? International Relations Theory and Religion’, in Jack Snyder (ed.). *Religion and International Relations Theory*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011: 91–114.

Barzegar, Kayhan. ‘Iran’s Foreign Policy Strategy after Saddam’. *The Washington Quarterly* 33, no. 1 (January 2010): 173–89.

Bellin, Eva. ‘Faith in Politics: New Trends in the Study of Religion and Politics’. *World Politics* 60, no. 2 (2008): 315–47.

Chatterjee, Kingshuk. ‘Of Islam and Other Things: The Drivers and Rhetoric in Iranian Politics’, in Priya Singh (ed.). *Re-envisaging West Asia: Looking beyond the Arab Uprisings*. Kolkata; New Delhi: Makaias and Shipra Publications, 2016: 56–84.

Chatterjee, Kingshuk. *A Spilt in the Middle: The Making of the Political Centre in Iran 1987–2004*. IFPS/CPWAS Occasional Paper, no. 2. New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2012.

Chatterjee, Kingshuk. ‘The “Tehran” Factor: Doomed to Destabilise?’ in Priya Singh and Sushmita Bhattacharya (eds.). *Perspectives on West Asia: The Evolving Geopolitical Discourses*. Kolkata; New Delhi: Makaias and Shipra Publications, 2012: 115–40.

Cordesman, Anthony H. ‘Iran’s Support for the Hezbollah in Lebanon’. *Center for Strategic and International Studies* (15 July 2006) http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060715_hezbollah.pdf.

Davutoğlu, Ahmet. ‘Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007’. *Insight Turkey* 10, no. 1 (2008): 77–96.

Ehteshami, Anoushiravan. ‘Iran’s Regional Policies since the End of the Cold War’, in Ali Gheissari (ed.). *Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, Politics*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009: 324–48.

Ehteshami, Anoushiravan and Raymond Hinnebusch. *Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System*. London; New York: Routledge, 1997.

Fox, Jonathan and Shmuel Sandler. *Bringing Religion into International Relations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

Gieling, Saskia. *Religion and War in Revolutionary Iran*. London: I.B. Tauris, 1999.

Kalın, Ibrahim. ‘Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey’. *Perceptions* XVI, no. 3 (2011): 5–23.

Levaggi, Ariel. ‘Turkey and Latin America: A New Horizon for a Strategic Relationship’. *Perceptions* XVIII, no. 4 (2013): 99–116.

Levitt, Matthew. *Hamas: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad*. New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 2006.

Lotfian, Saideh. ‘Nuclear Policy and International Relations’, in Homa Katouzian and Hossein Shahidi. *Iran in the 21st Century: Politics, Economics and Conflict*. London: Routledge, 2008: 158–80.

Mandeville, Peter and Sara Silvestri. *Integrating Religious Engagement into Diplomacy: Challenges and Opportunities*. Brookings Papers no. 67 (2015).

Milani, Mohsen M. ‘Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy in the Post-Saddam Era’, in Ali Gheissari (ed.). *Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, Politics*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009: 349–66.

Moin, Baqer. *Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah*. London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999.
Ozgur, Irem. *Islamic Schools in Modern Turkey: Faith, Politics, and Education*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Ozkan, Mehmet. *Religion, Historical Legacy and Weltanschauungs: The Cases of Turkey, India and South Africa*. [Unpublished PhD Dissertation] University of Seville, 2013.
Ozkan, Mehmet. 'Turkey in the Islamic World: An Institutional Perspective'. *Turkish Review of Middle East Studies* 18 (2007): 159–93.
Ozkan, Mehmet. 'Turkey's Political-Economic Engagement with Africa', in Justin van der Merwe, Ian Taylor and Alexandra Arkhangelskaya (eds.). *Emerging Powers in Africa: A New Wave in the Relationship?* London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016: 217–31.
Ozkan, Mehmet. 'Turkey's Religious Diplomacy'. *The Arab World Geographer* 17, no. 3, (2014): 223–37.
Ramazani, R. K. 'Iran's Foreign Policy: Independence, Freedom and the Islamic Republic', in Anoushiravan Ehtesami and Mahjoob Zweiri (eds.). *Iranian Foreign Policy: From Khatami to Ahmedinejad*. Reading, MA: Ithaca Press, 2008: 1–16.
Sandal, Nukhet A. and Patrick James. 'Religion and International Relations Theory: Towards a Mutual Understanding'. *European Journal of International Relations* 17, no. 1 (March 2011): 3–25.
Searle, John. 'How Performatives Work'. *Linguistics and Philosophy* 12: no. 5 (October, 1989): 535–58.
Sheikh, Mona Kanwal. 'How Does Religion Matter? Pathways to Religion in International Relations'. *Review of International Studies* 38, no. 2 (2012): 365–92.