

Justin van der Merwe • Ian Taylor • Alexandra Arkhangelskaya
Editors

Emerging Powers in Africa

A New Wave in the Relationship?

palgrave
macmillan

Editors

Justin van der Merwe
University of Stellenbosch
Stellenbosch, South Africa

Alexandra Arkhangel'skaya
Russian Academy of Sciences
Moscow, Russia

Ian Taylor
University of St. Andrews
St Andrews, United Kingdom

International Political Economy Series

ISBN 978-3-319-40735-7

ISBN 978-3-319-40736-4 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-40736-4

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016958285

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made.

Cover illustration: © Rob Friedman/iStockphoto.com

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature
The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

CONTENTS

1	Seeing Through the MIST: New Contenders for the African Space?	1
	Justin van der Merwe	
Part I	Theoretical Directions and New Geographies: Space, Time and Accumulation	15
2	Theorising Emerging Powers in Africa within the Western-Led System of Accumulation	17
	Justin van der Merwe	
3	The BRICS in Africa: Agents of Development?	39
	Ian Taylor	
4	Emerging Powers in the Southern Maritime Space	57
	Raymond Steenkamp Fonseca	

Part II The BRICS in Africa	75
5 Conceptualising the Dialectics of China’s Presence in Africa	77
Li Xing	
6 Nehru’s Neoliberals: Draining or Aiding Africa?	107
Ian Taylor, Justin van der Merwe, and Nicole Dodd	
7 New Dynamics or Old Patterns? South–South Cooperation Between Brazil and Angola	129
Jurek Seifert	
8 Guns and Poseurs: Russia Returns to Africa	159
Alexandra Arkhangelskaya and Nicole Dodd	
9 South African Corporations in BRICS: New Waves of Entrepreneurial Thinking?	177
Nadine Wenzel	
Part III Emerging Powers Beyond BRICS	199
10 South Korea in Africa: Exporting an ‘Economic Miracle’ or ‘Imperialist Mimicry’?	201
Murad Shamilov	
11 Turkey’s Political-Economic Engagement With Africa	217
Mehmet Ozkan	

12 Indonesian Engagements with Africa and the Revitalised ‘Spirit of Bandung’	233
István Tarrósy	
13 Conclusion: How New is the ‘New Wave’?	249
Ian Taylor	
Index	261

Turkey's Political-Economic Engagement With Africa

Mehmet Ozkan

Turkey's burgeoning relationship with Africa is a result of both its domestic transformation and changes in the global political economy. Turkey's domestic transformation has challenged the traditional Turkish partners in the economy and has aimed at diversifying its trade alternatives in line with changes in global power configurations. Changes in the international system have led countries to define their own interests in a newly emerging system. Turkey's response to such changes has been to define a multidimensional foreign policy and to develop economic and political relations with not only its immediate neighbours but also other regions and continents. Turkey's Africa policy is part and parcel with its redefined foreign policy.

Turkey-Africa relations have changed significantly in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. Turkey's Africa policy arguably represents one of the most successful aspects of Turkish foreign policy in recent years. This Africa initiative, the origins of which date back to 1998 and were fully implemented from 2002 onwards, is likely to become a lasting element of the nation's foreign policy (Hazar, 2015). In recent years, the Turkish government's interest toward the African continent has expanded into the domains of security, humanitarian assistance and eco-

M. Ozkan (✉)

Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), Bogota, Colombia

conomic relations. The nation's active involvement in Somalia, in particular, has received attention from across the continent and has contributed to the consolidation of Turkey's position in Africa. Thus far, closer economic cooperation, coupled with relatively large amounts of development aid and humanitarian assistance, has formed the basis of this new approach. This chapter aims to give a comprehensive perspective on the state of Turkey–Africa relations, its scope and importance and Turkey's unique model of engagement with Africa as an emerging power.

Implicit in this process is the cut-and-thrust of Turkey's state–capital relations when expanding into Africa. The model proposed in this chapter is a way of describing this process. The relationship is initiated via humanitarian and aid interventions for the purposes of reconstruction, and is followed and accompanied by economically driven activities including the building of infrastructure, creation of food security, healthcare, development of human capital and developing a credible local governance system. This would typically be followed by a higher level of political intervention attempting to subtly influence policy and decision-making in the recently reconstructed countries and regions. Hence, the humanitarian interventions provide the consent-forming component of the relationship followed by the reaping of economic benefits, which are further complemented by high-level political engagements.

Turkey's actors within this process comprise the various arms of government (agencies, embassies, business councils and their hosting of summits), which work in collaboration with non-governmental organisations and aid agencies (World Food Programme and the Turkish Red Crescent), and state-led companies, but also Turkey's private sector. The abovementioned components describe the coordination and interaction of Turkish actors across Africa, as they exploit 'geostrategic awareness' to gain leverage over possible competitors.

TURKEY'S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC MODEL IN AFRICA

Turkey's current Africa policy is largely the result of a response to the European Union's (EU) rejection of Turkey as a candidate member in 1997. As a result of this rejection, Turkey's political elites started to consider different options in expanding its foreign policy. The main focus of this reorientation effort was on traditionally neglected areas, such as Africa, Latin America and Asia. These modest opening plans could not be launched, however, until four years later due to political and economic tur-

bulence (Ozkan & Akgun, 2010). Coherent and consistent policy implementation was finally possible when Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AK Party) replaced a three-party coalition in 2002 (Ozkan, 2011).

The details of Ankara's Africa policy can be examined in five phases, each of them indicating a different level of understanding of, and approach to, the continent. The period between the AK Party's rise to power in 2002 and the designation of 2005 as the 'Year of Africa', represented a preliminary stage in Turkey's foreign policy towards Africa. It was during these years that initial assessments of Africa's potential were made and Turkish officials held lower-level meetings with their African counterparts. The designation of 2005 as the 'Year of Africa' represented an unmistakable sign of Turkey's commitment to building stronger relations with Africa (Siradag, 2013).

The second period, which started in 2005 and ended with the First Turkey–Africa Summit in 2008, marked a period of diversification of relations across a range of areas, including politics and the economy. During this period, Turkey–Africa relations made more progress than the Turkish authorities had initially predicted, while both sides became more familiar with their counterparts.

The third period began with the 2008 summit and continued until then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's August 2011 visit to the Somalian capital Moghadishu. This was when Turkey–Africa relations assumed a multidimensional nature. While the Turkish government launched embassies in various African countries, the nation's trade volume with Africa quadrupled from \$4 billion to approximately \$18 billion. Following phase one's formative nature, phases two and three involved heightened complexity of Turkey's Africa policy.

It was during the fourth period, which began with Erdogan's official visit to Somalia that Turkey–Africa relations evolved into a more mature political relationship (Ozkan and Orakci, 2015). In 2011, the Turkish government's Somalia initiative entailed the nation's focus on high politics, that is political matters and security issues, in addition to mere economic ties and humanitarian or development aid. Turkey's involvement in Somalia was arguably a second experience of state-building for Ankara, after its experiences with the non-recognised Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The restoration of relative public order and the world's renewed interest in the Somalian conflict elevated Turkey to being a prominent stakeholder whose opinions were widely appreciated. As a result of this, the Turkish authorities met with representatives from the EU, Great Britain, Spain, Norway and the USA, among others, on African issues (Davutoglu, 2012).

The end of 2014 marked the beginning of the fifth period in Turkey–Africa relations. This period arguably has focused on the ‘normalisation’ and institutionalisation of relations. Therefore, the current period has particular importance, as it holds the key to consolidating existing achievements and developing a more systematic approach. At that point, there were two pressing issues at hand. First, the second Turkey–Africa Partnership Summit was held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea in November 2014. The Malabo summit paved the way for the full normalisation of the Turkish government’s relations with African countries. Previously, most of the African leaders attending the first Turkey–Africa Summit in 2008 were reported to have had serious doubts about the sincerity of Turkey’s interest in the continent and had raised questions about the nation’s agenda. However, the Malabo Summit focused on the possibility of expanded cooperation and maximising mutual benefits in future thereby assuaging the African leaders’ concerns (Kalin, 2014).

A second imperative for the current phase is to deepen and broaden relationships. Thus far, government agencies including the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) and the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), have sought to independently explore the African continent and to develop their own perspectives. This has resulted in further diversification of Turkey’s interactions on the continent (Kavas, 2006).

Overall, Turkey’s mode of engagement with Africa has been a slowly deepening process with new elements being added as time passes. Similarly, new actors and institutions from the Turkish bureaucracy have also been involved in shaping Africa policy; meanwhile, African partners’ interests in developing these relations have also gradually increased. One can now view the relationship between Turkey and Africa as fully developed with all relevant actors contributing. This process has thus led to normalisation of these relations at social, political and economic levels. Turkey has transitioned from being a ‘new’ entrant into the African space to being an increasingly established partner with Africa.

NORMALISATION

Since 2010, Turkey has significantly expanded its diplomatic network in the continent by launching 30 new embassies and increasing the total number of its embassies to 39, along with four consulates. The number of

African diplomatic missions in Ankara, in turn, has risen from sixteen to 32 during the same period. High-level official visits continue to take place on an increasingly frequent basis (MFA, 2016).

Since 2004, the annual trade volume between Turkey and Africa rose from \$5.5 billion to \$23 billion in 2015. The total amount of Turkish investments in Africa has broken the \$6 billion-dollar mark (Hurriyet Daily News, 2016). Several dozen international agreements have been signed in order to promote commercial and economic cooperation and to establish bilateral business councils since 2010. These have been concluded with countries such as Ethiopia, South Africa, Somalia and Kenya, amongst others (Ozkan, 2013). Meanwhile, Turkish Airlines continues to operate direct flights to 46 destinations in 28 African countries. In seeking to build up African human capital, the YTB covers the cost of education in Turkish universities for hundreds of African students.

The Second Turkey–Africa Partnership Summit, as already mentioned, established the idea that Turkey's Africa policy has entered a new era. At this summit, the parties signed a joint action plan for 2014–2019 whereby they decided to elevate their relations to the level of strategic partnership. As this long-term plan showed the seriousness of the commitment of both parties to this relationship, it indicated that Turkey's Africa policy made serious contributions to making the country more relevant and visible in the international arena. This is consistent with the activities associated with phase five of Turkey's evolving relationship with Africa, which involved the normalisation and institutionalisation of relations.

Aid and humanitarianism in Turkey–Africa relations: Deepening phase one

Although Turkey's relationship with Africa has evolved and become increasingly complex, Turkish authorities remain aware of the importance of humanitarian assistance in Ankara's relations with the African continent (Hasimi, 2014). The Turkish model sees the humanitarian dimension as an entry point to the continent. In line with this policy, TIKA has established representation offices in seventeen countries in Africa to provide grants to the most disadvantaged nations. In the last decade, aid has been one of the strongest elements in Turkey's overall foreign policy, and its Africa policy in particular. It has arguably been part of the country's soft power strategy (Lough, 2012).

TIKA currently has operations in over 40 countries in Africa as part of Ankara's developmental aid policy. TIKA was initially established to help in the transition of the states in Central Asia, Caucasus and the Balkans. However, after the year 2003, the organisation has been transformed into a more global aid agency and has expanded their area of operations, including in Africa (Fidan and Nurdun, 2008). Through its offices, Turkey has shown a strong will to widen the cooperation with Africa, particularly with regard to projects that provide technical assistance. Turkey's former President Abdullah Gul explained that Turkey attempted to build relations with Africa by making 'health, education, agriculture, environment, infrastructure and capacity-building' strategic areas (Gul, 2008: 2). These areas continue to basically constitute Turkey's humanitarian aid to Africa.

Besides the activities of TIKA, Turkey has also utilised international organisations to provide aid to Africa. For example, through the World Health Organisation, World Food Programme (WFP) and the Red Crescent, Turkey has donated \$7.5 million to various African countries to assist them to cope with the negative effects of drought and other natural disasters. The amounts, however, are very small. In 2008, Turkey allocated \$3.5 million as humanitarian aid through the WFP (Daily Monitor, 2008), while in 2009, it made a modest donation of half a million dollars to the African Union budget (African Union Commission, 2009). In a similar vein, in 2007, Turkey for the first time hosted a summit of the Least Developed Countries (LDC), in Istanbul, 33 of which are in Africa (out of 49 members). During this summit, Turkey committed \$20 million in development aid for their use. To show Turkey's commitment to development of the LDC members, Ankara also hosted the fourth conference of LDCs in the first half of 2011.

Trade and institutional cooperation: Deepening phases two and three

Nothing can summarise the change in Turkey–Africa relations better than the increasing trade and institutional cooperation between the two partners. As mentioned above, the year 2005 was a turning point in Turkey's relations with Africa. Turkey obtained observer status in the African Union (AU) in 2005 (which later declared it a strategic partner in January 2008). In May 2008, Turkey joined the African Development Bank and strengthened its relations with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in East Africa and the Economic Community of West African States (Ozkan, 2010). The Foreign Economic Relations Board

of Turkey (DEİK) established eight business councils as part of Ankara's attempts to increase business activities with Africa. To accelerate these relations further, Turkey opened fifteen new embassies in Africa in 2008 alone, in addition to the twelve it already had on the continent, more than doubling the density of its diplomatic representation in Africa. Furthermore, in 2009 alone, Turkey appointed eight new ambassadors responsible for opening embassies in their designated countries. As already described, by December 2015 Turkey had 39 embassies in Africa and four consulates.

While these developments at political and institutional levels are important, Turkey's relationship with Africa is underwritten by rising bilateral trade. Turkey's trade volume with African countries was only \$5.4 billion in 2003; it increased more than two-fold to exceed \$16 billion in 2008 and despite the economic crisis it did not lose its pace, reaching around \$23 billion in 2015 (MFA, 2016). Yet, considering Turkey's total trade volume with the world as a whole, current ones with African countries are not significant. Nonetheless, Turkey's target is to increase trade volumes with Africa to around \$50 billion by 2023.

Turkey as a state-building actor: Phases four and five

In August 2011, shortly after famine was officially declared in parts of southern and central Somalia, then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan led a delegation composed of four ministers and members of Turkey's cultural and business elite to visit Mogadishu. Prime Minister Erdoğan also brought his family, to highlight the need for greater famine relief and to bring moral support to Somalis. This was the first visit to Mogadishu by a head of state or government from outside Africa in almost twenty years (Ali, 2011) and marked the start of a sustained increase in Turkish engagement in Somalia. In January 2015, Erdoğan—now as president of Turkey—returned to Mogadishu for talks with the government and to inaugurate several projects, including a hospital built with Turkish support. Both visits were widely celebrated and Erdoğan personally appears to be quite popular, especially in Mogadishu, where most of Turkey's aid projects are concentrated.

However, Turkey's engagement has not been without its opponents. In July 2013, the Turkish embassy in Mogadishu was attacked, leaving one dead and three Turkish security force members wounded (Omar and Sheikh, 2013). Shortly before President Erdoğan's January visit, militants attacked the hotel where the Turkish forward planning team was based. Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin ('al-Shabaab') claimed responsibility for both attacks.

Ankara's involvement in Somalia can be explained with a special focus on three approaches. Humanitarianism has been the main theme and since the beginning this has been one of the most pronounced official discourses on Somalia. Humanitarianism does not only have the components of emergency aid, but also includes a development aid aspect. With a mixture of both aid policies, Turkey has become a prominent actor in Somalia (Akgun, 2012).

The second aspect of Turkey's Somalia policy is related to implementation of its development policies. There has been a convergence of state apparatus and civil society organisations on the ground (Wasuge, 2016). Albeit lacking in coordination, this unofficial coalition has boosted Turkey's overall visibility in Somalia. Most importantly, Turkish developmental activities in Somalia, irrespective of whether carried out by state institutions or civil society, have been attributed to Turkey, making it appear as if Ankara is the initiator.

The third aspect of Ankara's involvement is to be found in its regional approach. Turkey has realised that the 'Somalia issue' goes beyond the nation-state, and includes regional and global dimensions (Orakci, 2012). This policy has mostly stemmed from a geopolitical understanding that without solving the regional balance any peace in Somalia is likely to be temporary. In the Fifth Annual Meeting of Ambassadors in Ankara, in January 2013, then-Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu demonstrated Turkey's recognition of the issue at hand when he announced Turkey's integrated strategy addressing the issues in eastern Africa as a whole. Davutoglu discussed Ankara's diplomatic commitment to ease tensions between Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia (Davutoglu, 2013). It should be noted that when it opened an embassy in Eritrea in 2013, Turkey became the only country to have embassies in all countries in the region.

Turkey has delivered around \$500 million in aid to Somalia through its developmental and humanitarian projects (Arman, 2015). These have centred on a number of projects, with interventions focused on six aspects: transport (air and road linkages); infrastructure (roads, airport, renovations, water and sanitation); healthcare (building hospitals and supplying and training healthcare workers); education (provision of scholarships and building of schools); religious (training of Imams and restoration of mosques); and traditional humanitarian activities (refugee camps and orphanages).

Many Turkish NGOs have also been active in the country, especially in central and southern Somalia. Turkish NGOs have circumvented restrictions on foreign organisations by working with local Somalian NGOs to deliver aid and implement their projects in distressed areas, or, in some cases, coordinated their projects from their headquarters in Turkey.

Less than four years after his first visit, Turkey's President Erdogan visited Mogadishu again in January 2015 to see the developments and oversee the ongoing projects. His visit, accompanied by a huge delegation, marked Turkey's strong intention to continue to focus on Somalia's state building and development. This was further cemented by his most recent visit in June 2016 when he opened a Turkish embassy in the Somali capital. Shortly before President Erdogan's June visit, Turkey organised an international Somalia conference to raise the issue of Somalia again at the international level. During this Istanbul meeting, Erdogan (2016) tweeted that:

Somalia has become a symbol of how we view Africa and of the brotherly relations we wish to establish with the African people. Turkey, through all its state bodies and NGOs as well as official and voluntary personnel, supports the rebuilding of Somalia. The International community should assume a more active role in Somalia. We, in cooperation with the international community, will continue to work until Somalia becomes a country of peace and stability.

Since 2011, a new but significant component of Turkey–Africa relations is under way: security. Turkey has always been hesitant to export security through its foreign policy, but this is changing. Turkey now holds a military base in Djibouti and is on the verge of opening one in Qatar. As part of this policy change at home, since 2011, Turkey has tried to contribute to increasing security in Africa. Security elements of Turkey–Africa relations have basically three dimensions. First, Turkey has contributed to international efforts to ensure peace and stability in Africa. Ankara contributes to the UN missions deployed in the continent. As of August 2015, Turkey took part in seven of the nine existing UN missions in Africa with its police and military officers. In addition, by the end of 2014, military training was provided in Turkey for 2,200 military personnel from over twenty African countries. For the period of 2015–2016 Turkey is expected to have received more than 1,200 African military personnel for training (Sinirlioglu, 2015).

Second, Turkey has contributed to security of international trade, particularly maritime security, via its efforts in the Horn of Africa. Since 2009, Turkey has taken an active role in combatting piracy in the Gulf of Aden and has provided military support to fight against piracy in cooperation with the EU and the UN. Thus far, four frigates have been deployed consecutively to combat piracy.

Third, security also underpins Ankara's state-building efforts in Somalia. Turkey, for instance, provides support to the Somali central government in the area of training security services. Turkey dedicated a budget of 20 million Turkish Lira for the restructuring of the Somali army and its police forces since 2011 (Time Turk, 2013). One of its projects is to build a non-commissioned officer school with a capacity of 100 student-officers in the first phase, followed by plans to start building the foundations of professional military ground, air and naval schools. Turkey's General Directorate of Security, the Turkish General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign affairs have conducted various studies on how to best restructure the Somali army and police forces. Building infrastructure, configuring and training the Somali police are all part of Turkey's development assistance. To this end, it has brought 60 Somali police officers to Turkey for training, through the General Directorate of Security. The General Directorate of Security has also prepared the design of their police uniforms. Subsequently, a police team of more than 500 police officers has come gradually to Turkey for training over the last three years (Time Turk, 2013). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is evaluating a project to restructure and train the Somali army provided by the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), as requested by the Somali government.

CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE: PHASE FIVE AND BEYOND?

As explained previously, Turkey started its relations with Africa with a heavy focus on aid and humanitarian dimensions; but it went beyond this and accelerated increasing trade and deepened its state-building and security component. However, despite the presence of this positive trajectory, Turkey's Africa relations are not without risks.

One can argue that there are two fundamental risks with the future direction of Turkey's relations with the African continent. The first issue relates to the emerging Africa fatigue in the country, which has developed due to a lack of sophisticated vision. The vision of the opening period

since 2002 has elapsed, and now an expanded vision and accompanying plan is needed. This problem, which presents itself inside certain government agencies today, could possibly reduce the African initiative from that of an effort to reposition Turkey in the global economic and political system into a mere diversion in foreign policy.

Another key problem relates to the potential influence of domestic developments on Turkey's Africa policy. It is no secret that the Gülen Movement has thus far pioneered the nation's efforts on the African continent through a network of charter schools and the activities of the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON). Since the December 17 (2013) corruption scandal and the subsequent political fallout, the Gülenists have sought to compensate for their losses at home by discrediting the Turkish government inside African countries and strengthening their ties to local communities. Considering that the power struggle in Turkey is unlikely to end over the short term, these developments could possibly contribute to closer cooperation between Ankara and African capitals, since the Turkish authorities are increasingly likely to develop a more direct and comprehensive policy toward the continent. In this sense, various aspects of Turkey–Africa relations will continue to remain at the forefront of public attention in the foreseeable future.

At present, Turkey–Africa relations appear to be stable. The Turkish government's efforts tend to be appreciated across the continent. It is possible, nonetheless, to identify certain shortcomings. The most important point right now relates to the challenging task of making the country's efforts matter on a regional and global scale.

Up until 2011, key African countries believed Turkey's sudden interest in Africa's affairs to be primarily economically motivated—which is why they concentrated on short-term benefits at the expense of the Turkish government's long-term contributions. Ankara's policy toward Somalia, however, helped transform African leaders' perceptions of Turkey at national and regional levels (Harper, 2014). Furthermore, official visits by Turkish leaders made positive contributions to Turkey's image in the continent. The upcoming years, though, will put Turkey's position as a security actor alongside other critical players, such as France, the United Kingdom and the USA, to the test. In terms of the emerging powers' role in Africa, one can argue that Turkey's place is now firmly secured in the continent, especially with regard to trade and humanitarian aid.

Domestically, the biggest challenge is the lack of understanding and interest regarding Africa both in policy circles and academia within Turkey. This continues to be problematic, despite more than a decade of engagement with the continent. There still remains an acute shortage of trained Turkish experts on African affairs. Although various Turkish institutions have launched Africa research centres in recent years, these organisations remain both ill-equipped and prone to reproducing extremely Orientalist approaches that are on the verge of becoming obsolete in the West. The fact that Turkish institutions falsely present Western arguments as new and original findings undermines the country's position in Africa in terms of academic expertise. In this sense, the Turkish government is required to take necessary steps to encourage graduate students and doctoral candidates to specialise in African studies in an effort to follow continental developments more closely. Furthermore, Turkish universities may establish Africa research centres to host lectures by prominent Africanist academics in order to familiarise the continent's leading minds with Turkey.

CONCLUSION

The model discussed spanned five phases. Phase one was a formative stage comprising economic involvement, development and humanitarian aid. In phases two to three, heightened complexity and further networked relationships were achieved. Phase four involved maturation of these relationships, and the introduction of security and high-level political negotiations. This phase also involved further differentiation and specialisation per country, such as with the Somalian initiative. Finally, phase five was characterised by the maintenance and stabilisation of these relations. The objective of this five-stage model is to move from uncoordinated overtures to institutionalisation and 'normalisation' of relations.

Turkey's model of gradually intensified relations with the continent may be useful for understanding the activities of other emerging powers. Of course, each emerging power has different ways of doing business, but perhaps the Turkish model may be utilised as a comparative tool. However, the Turkish model is not yet in its ultimate form or without problems. The long-term stability of Turkey's presence in Africa rests not only on commercial relations but also on the nation's commitment to developing lasting solutions to the continent's pressing problems—as the Somalian crisis has established. If the Turkish authorities can transform

their interest in Somalia into an explicit effort to establish peace and promote the nation's success, Turkey will arguably become a country capable of balancing its economic and political interests. This would, in turn, seriously contribute to Turkey–Africa relations and ensure that the African continent will remain a priority item in Turkey's foreign policy agenda over the next decades.

REFERENCES

- African Union Commission. (2009) The Government of the Republic of Turkey made a donation to the African Union Budget. *African Press Organisation*. Retrieved June 8, 2016, from <https://appablog.wordpress.com/2009/03/03/the-government-of-the-republic-of-turkey-made-a-donation-to-the-african-union-budget/>
- Ali, A. (2011). Turkey's Foray into Africa: A new humanitarian power? *Insight Turkey*, 13(4), 65–73.
- Akgün, M. (2012, December 22) Somali'de Yeni Bir Devlet İnşaa Ediyoruz. *Star*. Retrieved February 20, 2014, from <http://haber.stargazete.com/yazar/somalide-yeni-bir-devlet-insaa-ediyoruz/yazi-714006>
- Arman, A. (2015, January 21). Erdogan: The Hero of Somalia'. *Al-Jazeera*. Retrieved March 10, 2016, from <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/01/visit-erdogan-somalia-2015121124331818818.html>
- Daily Monitor (2008, August 13) Africa: Turkey donates \$3.5 million for Africa-Turkey summit to be held next week. *Daily Monitor*. Retrieved April 11, 2016, from <http://allafrica.com/stories/200808130809.html>
- Davutoglu, A. (2012). *2013 Yılına Girerken Dış Politikamız*. Ankara: Dışişleri Bakanlığı.
- Davutoglu, A. (2013, January 2). Address to 5th Annual Meeting of Ambassadors. *Ankara*. Retrieved February 15, 2016, from http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-ahmet-davutoglu-nun-v_-buyukelciler-konferansinda-yaptigi-konusma_-2-ocak-2013_-ankara.tr.mfa
- Erdogan, R.T. (2016, March 1). Somalia. *Twitter*. Retrieved June 8, 2016, from https://twitter.com/RT_Erdogan?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eerp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor
- Fidan, H., & Nurdun, R. (2008). Turkey's role in the global development assistance community: The case of TİKA. *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, 10(3), 93–111.
- Gul, A. (2008, September 22). Africa's development needs: State of implementation of various commitments, challenges and the way forward. Remarks by President of Turkey in New York. Retrieved March 15, 2016, from <http://www.un.org/ga/president/62/ThematicDebates/adn/turkey.pdf>

- Harper, M. (2014, December 15). The unlikely love affair between two countries. *BBC News*
- Hasimi, C. (2014). Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy and development cooperation. *Insight Turkey*, 16(1), 127–145.
- Hazar, N. (2015). Turkey's policy of outreach to Africa: An assessment. *Journal of Business Economics and Political Science*, 4(7), 3–11.
- Hurriyet Daily News (2016, March 25). Turkish envoy foresees vibrant cooperation with Africa. *Hurriyet Daily News*. Retrieved May 15, 2014, from <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-envoy-foresees-vibrant-cooperation-with-africa-.aspx?pageID=238&cnID=96933&NewsCatID=510>
- Kalin, I. (2014, November 22). A new phase in Turkish-African relations. *Daily Sabah*.
- Kavas, A. (2006). *Osmanli Afrika Iliskileri*. Istanbul: Tasam.
- Lough, R. (2012, June 3). Turkey tries out soft power in Somalia. *Reuters*. Retrieved January 28, 2016, from <http://www.reuters.com/article/somalia-turkey-idUSL5E8GP2LP20120603>
- MFA – Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2016, May 10). Turkey-Africa relations. Retrieved January 28, 2016, from <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>
- Omar, F. and Sheikh, A. (2013, July 27). Al-Shabaab claim attack on Turkish mission in Somalia, three dead. *Reuters*. Retrieved March 20, 2016, from <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-conflict-idUSBRE96Q0A420130728>
- Orakci, S. (2012, May 28). Somali'nin geleceği ve 2015 hedefleri. *DunyaBulteni*. Retrieved June 8, 2016, from <http://www.dunyabulteni.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=211627>
- Ozkan, M. (2010). What drives Turkey's involvement in Africa? *Review of African Political Economy*, 37(126), 533–540.
- Ozkan, M. (2011). Turkey's 'new' engagements in Africa and Asia: Scope, content and implications. *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, 16(3), 115–137.
- Ozkan, M. (2013). Does 'rising power' mean 'rising donor'? Turkey's development aid in Africa. *Africa Review*, 5(2), 139–147.
- Ozkan, M., & Akgun, B. (2010). Turkey's opening to Africa. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 48(4), 525–546.
- Ozkan, M., & Orakci, S. (2015). Turkey as a “political” actor in Africa—An assessment of Turkish involvement in Somalia. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 9(2), 343–352.
- Sinirlioglu, F. (2015, November 17). Turkey in Africa: A humanitarian approach. *The New Times*. Retrieved June 8, 2016, from <http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2015-11-17/194445/>
- Siradag, A. (2013). The making of the new Turkish foreign and security policy towards Africa: The rationale, roots and dynamics. *Africa Insight*, 43(1), 15–31.

- Time Turk. (2013, March 4). TSK Somali Askerini Eđitecek. *TimeTurk*. Retrieved June 10, 2013, from http://www.timeturk.com/tr/2013/03/04/tsk-somali-askerini-egitecek.html#.U0KBvqh_uBI
- Wasuge, M. (2016). *Turkey's assistance model in Somalia: Achieving much with little*. Mogadishu: The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies.