South-South Cooperation Beyond the Myths

Rising Donors, New Aid Practices
CHAPTER 3

The Turkish Way of Doing Development Aid?: An Analysis from the Somali Laboratory

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INTRODUCTION

One of the most novel parts of Turkey’s foreign policy since 2002 is its endeavour to be part of South–South cooperation (SSC) and to increase its visibility in development aid projects. This involvement—both at state and nongovernmental organization (NGO) levels—is particularly palpable on the African continent.

Turkey’s development aid policy is indeed just a different expression of a new foreign policy outlook towards various regions, which plays a supportive role in new openings. Ankara has been trying to develop its own understanding and implementation—a Turkish way of doing cooperation—based on experiences gained mostly from the Balkans and Central Asian republics. This chapter focuses on Turkey’s involvement in Somalia because that is where its efforts in Africa have been concentrated and the most visible, to the point that Turkey has been referred to frequently in international meetings and academic publications related to political affairs in the Horn of Africa. It is something new in recent history.
This chapter first argues that at societal and institutional levels, religion along with trade are key drivers—and to some extent legitimizing elements—of Turkey’s policy in Africa. It then shows that on the ideational front, Turkey’s involvement in Somalia is closely linked to broader shifts in its foreign policy and corresponds to the fact that authorities see Africa from a totally different perspective compared to what used to prevail there even a decade ago. Turkey’s SSC takes Africa as a priority in which Somalia de facto stands as a laboratory. Finally, the chapter explores the specificities of the Turkish intervention in Somalia and shows, for example, that Turkey is actively working through development projects of governmental institutions and civil society organisations to provide support to reestablish community services. It concludes that it is difficult to talk about a clear-cut Turkish “development policy”; it is better approached as a practical experience, which is in progress and paving the way for alternative discussions. Based on interviews and interaction with officials in Somalia, Turkey, and the other Horn of Africa countries along with the primary and secondary sources, the main aim of this chapter is to shed light on Turkish experiences of undertaking development aid in Somalia.

**SSC as a Foreign Policy Tool: Towards Extension and Institutionalization**

In this section, it is argued that Turkey’s official aid is very much connected to Ankara’s geographical and social interest as well as trade considerations with African recipient countries. Since its involvement in Somalia in 2011, Turkey has been eager to become a humanitarian and political actor on the continent rather than merely an economic power or donor. Turkish aid is a process of geographical extension and institutionalization.

Turkey started its aid activities as early as 1985. These became more coordinated once the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) was founded in 1992. TIKA has coordination offices in 54 countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Balkans, and Europe for delivering development assistance through technical projects and humanitarian activities. The agency is an autonomous organization under the tutelage of the Prime Minister. Its main function is to establish a bridge between development partners’ needs and relevant Turkish ministries and agencies. TIKA is also the main responsible state institution on Overseas Development Aid (ODA) reporting and data collection. It partners with a number of international organizations, including the United Nations (UN), the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the European Union (EU) institutions. TIKA typically provides technical cooperation projects, direct investments, loans and credits, humanitarian assistance, peace-building assistance, and contributions to international organizations.

TIKA initially was established to help the transition of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. However, as of 2003 it was transformed into a more global aid agency and has expanded its area of operations. For example, in 1992–2002 TIKA conducted 2346 projects and activities in total, and its annual average number of projects and activities was only 256 (Sahin 2007, 27). TIKA’s total projects and activities, however, expanded to 2780 in 2003–2006, notably in Africa, the Middle East, and North Africa. TIKA-sponsored projects towards the Middle East and Africa rose from 45 in 2005 to 150 in 2006 (Fidan and Nurdun 2008, 100). The first TIKA Program Coordinator Office in Africa was opened in Addis Ababa in 2005, followed by others in several additional countries. TIKA offices support development projects in their respective regions, and from these three offices it operates in 42 countries in Africa. With the opening of new embassies all over the continent—29 newly opened, now totalling 41—the number of TIKA offices in Africa is likely to increase as well, thus increasing Turkish aid flow to the continent.

The amount of TIKA’s international assistance has increased substantially since 2004. The annual amount between 2002 and 2004 was about US$80 million, while the annual average reached US$700 million between 2006 and 2009 (TIKA 2015). In 2013, Turkey’s ODA reached US$3308 billion. Multilateral ODA accounted for 5% of Turkey’s total ODA in 2013, provided through the UN—amounting to 21% of its multilateral ODA—as well as through the World Bank Group and regional development banks. Although Africa still represents a quarter of the TIKA budget, Turkish ODA to Africa increased by 67% from US$30.9 million in 2009 to US$400 million in 2014. Aid to the least developed countries (LDCs) also has increased to US$158.95 million in 2010 (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012). The bulk of bilateral assistance was delivered as project and programme aid, technical assistance, and involvement in post-conflict, peace-building operations, and humanitarian aid.

Besides TIKA, Turkey counts on other aid channels. The second institution that provides international aid is the Ministry of Education and third is the military. The Ministry of Education usually provides scholarships to students and supports educational institutions abroad. The military is
involved mostly in training. The Religious Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and the Turkish Red Crescent (Kizilay) also need to be mentioned here. Through Eximbank\(^1\) and the Ministry of Economy, Turkey also gives direct economic support to Africa’s development; however, their involvements as state institutions are usually minor.

Since 2002, a new Turkish foreign policy has been established, which includes active participation in the fight against poverty and increasing development and humanitarian aid. The speed of change is impressive: In less than a decade, Turkey has shifted from having almost not-more-than-formal relations with Somalia to establishment of an increasingly comprehensive partnership. SSC did not exist until the early 2000s in Turkish discourse and practice. According to the Foreign Ministry website, net disbursements of a South–South cooperation budget (i.e. bilateral and multilateral) for Turkey were US$602 million in 2007; while in the same year, it was US$343 million for Colombia and US$270 million for the Republic of Korea. Between 2002 and 2007, as the financial amount for the SSC was multiplied by 3 for Colombia and 4 for the Republic of Korea, the SSC fund increased by 20 in the Turkish case (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012).

TIKA and Turkish civil society organizations have been active for a long time in the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Balkans. Nevertheless, the country has experienced an increased interest and a rise in the amount of both official and unofficial aid to Africa in the last decade. Whereas Turkey recorded an approximately 7% annual economic growth rate until 2011, her ambition and scope of activities in the field of development aid have increased in tandem. In parallel with its economic dynamism,\(^2\) Turkey has been continuously increasing its official development aid since 2004 and implementing open policies towards historically neglected areas in Turkey’s foreign policy.

The basic reason for this geographical extension of influence to the African continent lies in the reorientation of Turkish foreign policy that basically has, at least, three dimensions: (1) a new geographical perception in Ankara’s outlook towards the whole world, which accepts that Africa and Asia are not regarded as distant and troubled regions but as possible partners; (2) considerable efforts to reposition Turkey as a “central country” rather than a “bridge” between the East and West and to develop an institutionalized partnership with Asia and Africa in a changing global economy in order to play a more active role in international relations; and (3) an increase in activities in all regions and international organisations in order to contribute to regional and global peace (Ozkan 2011, 116–117).
Ankara’s increasing interest in Somalia is part and parcel of this policy. Turkey’s contribution as a donor was not visible until recently because it was both modest and poorly coordinated (Kulaklikaya and Nurdun 2010) but is increasingly palpable, especially in Somalia.

**Africa as a Priority, Somalia as a Laboratory**

The economic results of these new openings are much clearer in Turkey–Africa relations. For example, Turkey’s trade volume with African countries was only US$5.4 billion in 2003; by 2011 it had increased more than threefold, exceeding US$17 billion, whereas China’s trade with Africa was around US$100 billion and Indian–African trade was US$46 billion in the same year. Turkish investments in Africa are increasing steadily and were estimated to be US$1 billion by the end of 2007 (Yildiz 2007). Trade thus has been an important accelerating factor in increasing Turkey’s official development aid to Africa.

The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency’s main areas of cooperation in Africa include agriculture, health, education, water and sanitation, vocational training, institutional-capacity development, and humanitarian assistance. Initiated in 2008, the Agricultural Development Program covers 13 countries: Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Senegal, Comoros, Madagascar, Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda and is likely to be extended in the future.

Turkey also gives economic support to Africa’s development through international organisations, although multilateral aid only constitutes about 6% of Turkey’s total ODA both in 2008 and 2009 (OECD 2011). In 2007, Turkey for the first time hosted a summit in Istanbul of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), where it committed US$20 million in development aid for them and promised a further US$3 million to be allocated in three years to combat the AIDS epidemic. In 2009, it made a modest donation of US$0.5 million to the African Union budget. In May 2011, the Fourth UN Conference on LDCs was held in Istanbul at which 33 African countries participated. Turkey invited 650 businesspeople and investors to the conference maintaining that the biggest contribution to Africa was to be made through its entrepreneurs and its own resources (see [http://www.ldc4istanbul.org/](http://www.ldc4istanbul.org/)). At the end of the summit, participant countries agreed for the first time to establish a mechanism to monitor and follow-up on whether the promises and pledges were kept and also to issue an annual progress report for Africa.
Turkey’s policy in Somalia is comprehensive and multidimensional. Emergency humanitarian aid was the first step in its involvement in Somalia. It was launched following the scores of deaths in 2011 caused by the drought and famine in Somalia and West Africa. Turkey became aware of this crisis through the international media, as it previously had not been an issue on its policy agenda. On August 19, 2011, then Prime Minister, now President Erdoğan, visited the capital city of Mogadishu, accompanied by a large delegation that included his wife Emine Erdoğan, his daughter Sümeyye Erdoğan, then Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdağ, then Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, and other ministers and executives (Sabah, 19 August 2011). Besides the fact that this was the first official visit to Somalia in 20 years, it brought this subject to the attention of the international community and of the Turkish public.

At that time, the goal of the Prime Minister and his delegation was mainly to provide emergency humanitarian aid for the people in need rather than to establish a long-term Somalia policy. Turkey sent a large amount of food aid and other necessities and launched a variety of campaigns to stem the crisis. The decision and concrete action garnered appreciation not only from the Somalis but also foreign countries. For example, Somalian President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud praised the way Turks are implementing development aid:

They taught the Somalis to drive the vehicles—that’s what makes the difference. We have been constantly preaching to our international partners—“Don’t do the work for us, do the work with us.” This is the difference—the Turks are doing the work with us. They are training the Somalis, improving their capacity and introducing a new work culture to Somalia.”

This aid provided Turkey with legitimacy when it developed its subsequent policies towards Somalia.

Development assistance has been one of Turkey’s “soft-power” strategies in recent years (Ali 2011). In Somalia, the country was invested in rebuilding its war-torn infrastructure—that is, the airport in Mogadishu and much-needed paving of roads between the city centre and the airport. This facilitated direct flights by Turkish Airlines that now connect Istanbul to Mogadishu.

Turkey provided Somalia with essential infrastructure projects without conditions attached. It built field hospitals and sent doctors much-needed medical supplies and equipment because they have to care for approximately 1200 patients daily. In addition, a hospital with a 200-bed capacity was opened. TIKA cooperated with the State Hydraulic Works
(DSI) to drill wells to provide for the water needs of 126,000 people. An Agricultural School was opened to educate Somalis on how to counteract drought and to foster awareness of the richness of their land. Turkey also helped to build a Fisheries Training School. Although Somalia has Africa’s longest ocean strip, its ongoing civil war, which has continued for almost a quarter of a century, put an end to fishing on one of the world’s most beautiful coastlines (Zaman, 24 February 2013).

Turkey has taken on leadership and sought external support for helping and restructuring Somalia. On August 12, 2011, it called on the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) for an emergency meeting (BBC Turkce, 17 August 2011) in Istanbul regarding the famine crisis in Somalia. A total of ₺228 million (US$105.5 million) was raised (SBN, 18 August 2011). During this meeting contributions were made and pledges announced by Turkey, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Gabon, Qatar, Bahrain, Algeria, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, and Senegal, with a request to others to follow suit.

The Turkish Red Crescent, one of the first aid agencies that went to the region, undertook to organize the distribution of the funds collected. Prime Minister Erdoğan visited Somalia, after his preplanned visit to West Africa from August 19–20, to observe the distribution of aid as well as to view the situation on the ground. He was joined by a delegation, which included Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, a large number of Turkish entertainers, media members, and businessmen (Euronews Turkce, 19 August 2011). Statements made by Prime Minister Erdoğan during this visit urged the world community to help Somalia, stating that humanity’s conscience is being tested because the situation in Somalia is truly severe (Zaman, 20 August 2011). Erdoğan’s call for aid contributed to the increase of awareness and sympathy about the matter, especially in the Islamic world.

Then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan focused on Somalia for a significant portion of his speech at the UN General Assembly on September 22, 2011:

No one can speak of peace, justice, and civilization in the world if the outcry rising from Somalia is left unheard. It is impossible for me to put into words the poverty and suffering I have seen in Somalia. The tragedy of Somalia, where tens of thousands of children died due to the lack of even a piece of bread and a drop of water, is a shame for the international community.

Erdoğan also stated that the conscience of humanity was under question, and he criticized the world for watching the events as if it were a movie
Saban USA, 23 September 2011). Turkey has organized joint meetings about Somalia with the United Nations, called two Istanbul Conferences in May 2010 and June 2012, and participated in the meeting on Somalia held in London on February 23, 2012.

The significant amount of development and humanitarian aid Turkey has poured into the country, as well as increased commercial developments, are the main bridges of its new Africa policy. The efforts made in Somalia can be seen as a test case for the evaluation of its real impact in Africa, and Somalia is serving as a laboratory for Turkey’s new engagement in African policy. Its engagement efforts try to establish Turkey’s status as a political, not only economic, actor. As its relationship with Somalia continues to be strengthened, deputy prime ministers and many other ministers make official visits to follow-up on projects. As a result, Somalia has become a quasi-internal issue for Turkey’s government and society.

A Turkish Way of Doing Development Aid?

Turkey’s involvement in Somalia should not be viewed in isolation. Although it has received the most attention, it should be perceived in the context of Ankara’s wider Africa policy. Turkey has a long history of trade and other involvement in Africa, including Somalia, particularly during the Ottoman Empire. One can come across this type of legitimating discourse in both countries. During the past decade, Somalia has served as an ideal country for Ankara to display its model of humanitarian diplomacy. It is a fellow Muslim country and has massive humanitarian and development needs. Turkey’s form of engagement in Somalia has some characteristics that makes it specific—that is, its social and religious dimension and its approach to “state-building.”

The Social and Religious Basis: From Civil Society-led Initiatives to a State-led Policy

In addition to government organisations, such as the Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet), NGOs have been actively engaging and supporting Turkey–Africa relations. It is worth noting that traditionally, the role of civil society in Turkish foreign relations has been quite limited, and usually it has played a complementary role to state policy. However, in the 2000s, probably for the first time during the Republican era, civil society organizations have not only contributed to foreign policymaking but also have followed the state. Conservative business associations ideologically and politically close to the ruling Justice and Development
Party have been the pioneers in opening up Turkey–Africa relations since 2002. International aid organisations, such as the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), have paved the way for the acceleration of Turkey–Africa relations since 2005, exemplifying the converging interests between state and civil society. This convergence can be explained partly as a result of the ideological proximity between these actors. The IHH has been responsible for many evolving works ranging from education and health to human development in 43 countries in Africa. Now it is especially helping thousands of people improve their vision through its Cataract Project conducted in hospitals in the Sudan. IHH directly contributes to numerous projects including drilling wells and setting up schools and hospitals in numerous African countries (Oruc 2007).

Many other civil society organizations (CSOs), such as Dosteli, Cansuyu, and Yeryuzu Doktorlari, are active in Africa. They serve the continent in many areas from education to health and also provide African students with scholarships to study at Turkish universities. This has led to close cooperation between CSOs and the state apparatus. Turkish CSOs have been instrumental in extending Turkey’s geographical influence. Diyanet, until the early 2000s, did not play an active role in foreign policy, instead focused on the religious issues of Muslims in Turkey (Ozkan 2014).

On the contrary, in Somalia, the state initially led the policy and civil society organizations followed. In 2011, the first involvement of the Diyanet in Somalia was solely in the form of direct humanitarian aid. However, it has shifted the focus of its projects to fit the State’s core purposes such as education, religious services, and bringing students from Somalia to complete religious studies in theology faculties in Turkey. Although the numbers kept fluctuating, as of 2014, there are 300 students studying in Turkey with the help of the Diyanet. It is estimated that the Diyanet has spent more than US$3.5 million in total for its activities in Somalia since 2011.

In a way, the experience of civil society-led, state-followed initiatives in Turkey’s Africa policy has reversed and now one can claim that the state has taken over the leading role. As its premise, the intervention of the Directorate for Religious Affairs in Somalia has been the consequence of an urgency to respond to famine and drought rather than the product of voluntary planning. Nonetheless, especially with the opening of the Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu, the involvement of the Directorate has become more organized. As a result, the Directorate for Religious Affairs appointed an attaché for religious affairs to Mogadishu in the mid-2014 to expand relations in terms of religious understanding.
Religion and history are the two most important resources used to legitimize and support state-to-state relationships and for social relations in Muslim African countries. With its multidimensional foreign policy approach, religion has become one of Turkey’s soft power elements, notably in Africa. Many CSOs operating in Somalia have been motivated by religious brotherhood and have motivated their individual donors through Islamic discourse. Similarly, Muslim solidarity helps facilitate understanding of why Turkish NGOs are well received and easily accepted by Somalis on the ground, despite the fact that Somalis are known to be very sensitive to foreign interference.

The following is a list, albeit possibly not exhaustive, of Turkish organizations and institutions present and active in Somalia, according to Akgün (2012):

- Aegean Health Association Federation (ESAFED)
- Africa Brotherhood and Solidarity Association (AFKAD)
- Anadolu Agency
- Association of International Physicians (AID)
- Aziz Mahmud Hüdayi Foundation
- Bashir Association
- Cansuyu
- Charity Stone
- Deniz Feneri
- Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet)
- Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD)
- Doctors Worldwide
- Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms (IHH), Turkey
- IGMG Hasana Association
- IHH Europe
- Ihlas Holdings’ Foundation
- International Security Research Association (ISRA)
- Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality
- Ministry of Health
- Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB)
- Red Crescent
- State Airport Authority
- State Hydraulic Works
- Turkish International Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA)
- Yardimeli
They provide feedback and expertise that feed into governmental strategy. Prior to the Second Istanbul–Somali Conference, a Somali Civil Society Groups’ meeting was held in Istanbul on May 26, 2012. Somali’s Traditional Opinion leaders, who elect the members of Parliament and Constituent Assembly, as well as scholars, civil society members, and diaspora representatives, intellectuals, youth and women representatives, discussed Somalia’s current problems and options for the future.

The various foundations and institutions carry out projects either as a single organization or with a local partner. They also often cooperate with state institutions for these reasons: (1) to avoid overlapping with the work of public institutions and (2) to share experiences and expertise about the difficulties in the field for security and bureaucratic details. An office called the Somalia Coordination Council, led by the Vice-Prime Minister, regularly meets in Ankara to evaluate the situation in the field and coordinate these multiactor and multidimensional activities. This type of coordination at the country level is the first ever in Turkish foreign policy.

The human and social dimension of its programme in Somalia is accentuated by the scholarships provided to students who are willing to get a degree at one of Turkey’s numerous universities. During Prime Minister Erdoğan’s visit to Somalia on August 19, 2012, a promise was given to provide scholarships to more than 1200 Somali students (Sabah, 21 February 2013). To accomplish this, the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) provided scholarships to 421 university-level students with Somali nationality since 2012; other state agencies, such as Diyanet, provide scholarships nearly 650 students residing in Turkey and around 400 in Somalia, both at university and high school levels. Since 2010, the Turkish government agency, YTB, has provided and coordinated Turkish scholarships and a special scholarship scheme is designed for African students. The scholarships has been distributed on the basis of an assessment of their income and needs.

As the author of this chapter has personally observed in Somalia and elsewhere in Africa, students who want to study in certain departments, such as social sciences, agriculture, civil engineering, political science, and international relations, were given priority in relation to the needs of those departments. Turkey is the country that receives the largest number of Somali students with scholarships, currently approximately 1300. Students are expected, one day, to play a significant role in the social, economic, and political development of their country and to establish sustainable partnerships with Turkey.
Finally, Turkey contributes to the social reconstruction of Somalia through the Somali diaspora. In this context, Somalia’s diaspora in various countries were interviewed, noting that it gave support to act together instead of being fragmented. A well-attended Somali diaspora meeting held in Istanbul during the summer of 2014 led to identification of problems as well as potential cooperation opportunities through workshops (Inanc 2014). Ankara’s Somalia involvement has contributed to development of a culture of joint functioning between civil society and state institutions, and its Somalia policy works as a layered web with several actors and aspects.

A Specific Approach to State-Building?

Turkish authorities along with the UN organized a conference in Istanbul on May 21, 2012, entitled “Preparing Somalia’s Future: Goal 2015.” This conference’s goal was to address water, energy, transportation, and racism issues; it was attended by 57 countries and 11 regional and international organizations. It set out a roadmap for the reconstruction of Somalia’s state and introduced a five-point comprehensive plan, which included the following themes: the establishment of national unity, the creation of a new political system, a comprehensive structuring of the economy, the configuration of national Somali forces, and the development of the country (Al-Shadid, 10 December 2012).

In his 2011 speech at the UN, Erdoğan expressed regret that Somalia’s issues had been managed by the international community in Nairobi rather than in Mogadishu since the mid-1990s, while defending the principle of sovereignty of the Somali state. Although this critical rhetoric continued to exist, the official Turkish government and social aid organizations were working together to rebuild Somalia from scratch (Akgün 2012). Positively or negatively, if the experience of Turkey’s help in the state-building process in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was not taken into account, then state-building was never at the core of Turkish foreign policy.

Turkey has supported the establishment of some government-supported organizations and institutions, as well as some projects in various countries such as Afghanistan, Palestine, Tunisia, and Libya. Nevertheless, the experience in Somalia is different compared to the previous ones, as everything had to be rebuilt from the ground up. Moreover, Somalia’s ongoing 20-year civil war and its legacies of chaos and a failed state left it with a situation that can be described as an unsystematic structure. Therefore, the Somalia experience marks the first for Turkey in terms of state-building.
This kind of policy requires a very comprehensive approach and significant knowledge of the local context. In considering how Western countries participated in state-building in Somalia in the post-colonial period, Turkey attempted to play a more supportive role. The tactic chosen by Turkey was to put forward local Somali actors and strengthen them while supporting various projects relating to emergency aid and developmental assistance. The Turkish authorities did not officially use a “state-building discourse” but promoted Somali actors’ ability to make their own decisions and to establish a mechanism that would allow them to stand on their own feet for the reconstruction of the country. In that sense, the Turkish approach to state-building can be described as building on and working closely with both social and institutional capacity, without referring to or mentioning the term “state-building.”

In addition, Turkey contributed to Somaliland, which had acquired a semi-independent status in 1991 and is reluctant to unify under the single state of Somalia. Turkey believes that it would be difficult, in terms of structuring a Somali state, to unite Somaliland, Puntland, and Mogadishu under one “roof,” but it hopes to foster a political dialogue between these entities. In this context, Turkey has added another item to its policy in Somalia by acting as a mediator in talks between the central government and Somaliland (Sabah, 14 April 2013).

In this framework, Turkey’s President Abdullah Gül met with the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia, Hasan Sheikh Mahmud, and Somaliland’s President, Ahmed Silanyo, on April 13, 2013, at the Presidential Palace in Çankaya and brokered an agreement between the two leaders. The Ankara Communiqué was signed as the first step of a new process to resolve the conflict between the Federal Republic of Somalia and Somaliland. In a meeting that Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu also attended, the resolution of disputes between Somalia and Somaliland as well as a further deepening of relations between Turkey and the African countries were discussed, primarily within the framework of regional issues. Accordingly, both parties agreed to come together again in Istanbul within 90 days to shape their future and resolve problems. After realizing the second phase of the negotiations within the 90 days during 2013, another meeting to discuss the process of negotiations took place in Turkey in the Spring of 2014. Although the reunification of Somalia is unlikely, Turkish efforts have contributed to setting up a common forum where Somalis can at the very least talk about issues and attempt to solve them through dialogue.
The question here is whether there is a Turkish version of state-building that can be derived from Ankara’s Somalia experience; and, if there is one, to what extent can it be differentiated from the Western experience. Turkey has one of the few embassies operating in Mogadishu along with the UK, China, and the US. It is too early to contend that there is a Turkish model of state-building; however, one can argue that what Turkey has done in Somalia has opened the way and that there is a chance for a possible reestablishment of Somalia’s social and institutional structures.

**Exporting Security—and Becoming a Target**

Turkey tries to export security as well by providing support to the Somali central government in the area of security service training. Turkey dedicated a budget of ₺20 million for the restructuring of the Somali army and its police forces since 2011. One of its projects is to build a non-commissioned officers’ school with a capacity of 100 student-officers in the first phase, followed by plans to start building the foundation for a professional military Ground, Air and Naval School. Turkey’s General Directorate of Security, the Turkish General Staff, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have conducted various studies on how to best restructure the Somali army and police forces. Building an infrastructure, configuring, and training the Somali police are all part of Turkey’s development assistance programme.

To this end, it brought 60 Somali police officers to Turkey, through the General Directorate of Security, then sent them back after they were trained at the Police Academy. The design of the Somali police uniforms also was handled by the Directorate. Subsequently, a team of more than 500 police officers was expected to go to Turkey to be trained in the upcoming years (*TimeTurk*, 4 March 2103). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is evaluating a project provided by the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) to restructure and train the Somali army, as requested by the Somali government. The initial phase of the project, which is intended to develop the fundamentals for a non-commissioned officers’ school with a capacity of 100, has been planned as part of the project prepared by the TSK team; it was to include one brigadier, two lieutenant-colonels, two commanders, and one colonel in consultation with Somali officials (*TimeTurk*, 4 March 2013).

Al-Shabaab, an extremist group that controls much of Southern Somalia, launches periodic attacks against Turkish targets. Its goal is to try to discourage Turkey from continuing its aid activities in the country. For instance, in an attack targeting the Red Crescent aid convoy on April
15, 2013, 15 Somali aid workers were killed and 4 Turks were wounded (Taraf, 15 April 2013). Also, a Turkish businessman was assassinated at the hotel he was staying in Mogadishu on May 25, 2012. Al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility for two more deadly attacks. One of them in October 2011 was a suicide attack aimed at public buildings in Mogadishu that led to the deaths of 70 students to whom Turkey had provided scholarships. This violence was perceived as an attack against Turkey, which then sent an air ambulance to treat the surviving injured students. Another major incident was a direct attack on a Turkish target. It was carried out by a suicide bomber located in front of an annex building of the Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu on July 27, 2013. One of the four Turkish special operations officers was killed in the clash and others were injured. On Twitter, Al-Shabaab has been accusing Turkey of supporting a non-Islamic and secular structure in Somalia.

The second major security issue in Somalia is the widespread problem of piracy on the coastline. Since 2009, Turkey has taken an active role in combatting piracy in the Gulf of Aden and has provided military support to fight against this scourge in cooperation with the EU and the UN. The Turkish G-class frigate, TCG Giresun, joined the Combined Task Force 151, which was formed by the UN Security Council (Hurriyet, 17 February 2009). The Giresun frigate was sent on a four-month mission, starting on February 25, 2009, within the framework of the Turkish Armed Forces’ authorisation to serve in the sea off of Somalia; the Turkish Parliament accepted this deployment on February 10, 2009.

According to the authorisation, which was valid for one year, the Turkish Armed Forces personnel would not engage in ground operations against piracy and armed robbery; instead, it would provide protection to Turkish merchant and military ships within its task area. A total of 263 personnel, including 32 commissioned officers, 150 non-commissioned officers as well as 9 specialized sergeants and 72 rank-and-file workers were to be aboard the frigate until its mission ended on June 25, 2009 (Stratejik Boyut, 17 February 2009).

After its mandate expired, the Giresun returned to Turkey. However, on June 19, 2009, a different frigate, the Gediz, was sent to the Gulf of Aden; its crew includes 28 commissioned officers, 156 non-commissioned officers as well as 10 specialized sergeants and 72 rank-and-file personnel (Sabah, 19 June 2009). Subsequently, the TCG Gokova frigate was sent to combat piracy after the return of the Gediz because of the expiration of its mandate in September 2009. There were total of 267 staff, including 30
commissioned officers, 158 non-commissioned officers, and 79 soldiers; they served on the frigate for five-and-a-half months, until February 2010, in the Gulf of Aden (denizhaber.com, 10 July 2013). On February 20, 2010, Turkish special forces SAT Commandos neutralized seven sea pirates in the Gulf of Aden. The TCG Gemlik frigate (F-492) indicated that SAT Commandos impeded pirates from attacking a Japanese ship in the Gulf of Aden (Milliyet, 21 February 2010).

In addition, on April 1, 2010, a Taiwanese flagged ship was hijacked and then on April 7, 2010, a Turkish bulk carrier, YASIN-C, was hijacked while on its way to within 270 nautical miles of Kenya’s Mombasa port. The ship, with a crew of 25 Turkish nationals, was carrying bulk wheat, which it was being taken from the port of Mariupol in the Ukraine to Mombasa. In a statement delivered by the Turkish General Staff on April 1, the Gallipoli frigate had interfered with a pirate ship in the Gulf of Aden, which was preparing to attack other ships, and captured nine pirates (Afrika Gundemi 2010, 36–37). Again, in a Turkish General Staff statement printed in the Afrika Gundemi (2010, 36–37), the Gallipoli frigate reportedly organized an operation on April 18, 2010, with two speedboats near the northeast of the Seychelles against a pirate ship, which was close to the route of the Turkish-flagged ship Servet-Y. Following this operation, 13 pirates were neutralized and the materials used were captured.

CONCLUSION

Turkey’s foreign policy has made a radical transition over the course of a decade. Its economy is growing rapidly, and it has become more outward-oriented and increasingly confident as a regional and global power. So far, Turkey’s official development aid is connected to its geographical and social interests as well as commercial considerations. Turkey’s opening to Africa and heavy involvement in Somalia have been part of this political and social interests, which has developed a different foreign policy compared to earlier decades. Although this opening and transformation in foreign policy is still in progress, the Somalia experience has increased Turkey’s proficiency in developing its approach to aid and Africa.

Turkish presence in Somalia is different in some aspects, as compared to other actors within the region. First of all, the nature and implementation of humanitarian aid is quite distinct. Turkey’s goal is to succeed with long-term development projects in the region mostly at a micro-level so as to affect people’s lives directly. Second, the common religion of Islam
plays an important role in legitimizing Turkey’s presence in Somalia and in creating trust between actors, as opposed to Western actors.

Despite these differences, Turkey’s long-term sociopolitical existence and stability in the region depends not only on increasing trade relations but also on efforts to find durable solutions for the African continent’s problems, which are similar to those in Somalia. If Turkey is able to contribute to peace and security in Somalia, it could then join the group of powerful political nations, along with the US, France, and Britain, who are interested in promoting the continent’s economic and political stability, instead of being part of the group that only has economic interests in Africa (e.g., arguably, India and Brazil). To that extent, the Somali laboratory is for Turkey somehow similar to the Sudanese field for China, where economic interests and political circumstances in the country have led it to adopt a more political approach.

The Somalia example is not only an important turning point for Turkey–Somalia relations but also reflects Turkey’s strategy to be one of the major players in promoting Africa’s development. Its successes or failures could potentially shape the priorities of Turkey’s Africa policy as well as determine how Africa and other actors in the region will perceive Turkey in the upcoming years.

NOTES

1. Turkish Eximbank is an official export credit agency and has been mandated to support foreign trade and Turkish contractors/investors operating overseas; see www.eximbank.gov.tr.

2. Turkey’s nominal GDP in 2014 reached US$806 billion. According to GDP figures, Turkey is the seventeenth largest economy in the world and the sixth in Europe; see “EU bilateral trade and trade with the world,” 2013.

3. In 2008, Turkey donated US$7.5 million to various African countries via international organizations, such as the WHO, WFP, and the Red Crescent, to assist them to cope with the effects of drought and other natural disasters. In 2008, Turkey donated US$3.5 million in humanitarian aid through the WFP. For details see, Özkan and Akgun (2010).


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